Crypto Guarantee Service Xinbi Processed $17.9B After Telegram Ban: TRM Labs

Why It Matters

The resilience of Xinbi demonstrates how illicit crypto‑finance infrastructure can adapt to regulatory crackdowns, posing ongoing AML challenges for the broader ecosystem. Its continued volume signals persistent demand for guarantee services that underwrite scam economies.

Key Takeaways

• Xinbi processed $17.9B on‑chain volume despite bans.
• Migration to XinbiPay wallet sustained activity after Telegram ban.
• Guarantee services fragment across platforms to evade enforcement.
• TRM links Xinbi to pig‑butchering and cybercrime schemes.
• Earlier reports flagged $8.4B stablecoin inflows to Xinbi.

Pulse Analysis

Guarantee services have become a pivotal layer in the crypto‑enabled money‑laundering stack, offering escrow‑like protection that scammers rely on to reassure victims. Xinbi’s near‑$18 billion on‑chain throughput underscores the scale at which these platforms operate, dwarfing many legitimate DeFi protocols. By aggregating inflows, outflows, and internal transfers, such services obscure the ultimate destination of illicit proceeds, complicating the work of blockchain analytics firms and law‑enforcement agencies alike.

When Telegram clamped down on Chinese‑language guarantee groups in 2025, Xinbi swiftly migrated its user base to alternative messaging channels and introduced XinbiPay, a dedicated wallet that re‑centralized transaction flows. This fragmentation strategy—spreading operations across multiple platforms while building proprietary infrastructure—mirrors a broader trend among illicit actors to evade single‑point shutdowns. For regulators, the lesson is clear: enforcement must evolve beyond platform bans to target the underlying financial plumbing that these services construct.

The persistence of Xinbi, coupled with earlier reports of $8.4 billion in stablecoin inflows, signals a sustained demand for laundering solutions in Southeast Asia and beyond. Investors and custodians should heighten due‑diligence on counterparties that may inadvertently interact with guarantee services. Meanwhile, advanced analytics, cross‑jurisdictional cooperation, and real‑time monitoring will be essential to dismantle the adaptive networks that keep the scam economy afloat.