Beyond New START: Prospects for U.S.–Russian Nuclear Arms Control

Beyond New START: Prospects for U.S.–Russian Nuclear Arms Control

Global Security Review
Global Security ReviewApr 14, 2026

Key Takeaways

  • New START expired; no legal framework remains
  • Russia halted inspections, eroding verification trust
  • Issue‑specific agreements seen as pragmatic next steps
  • China’s nuclear growth complicates bilateral arms control

Pulse Analysis

The legacy of bilateral arms control between Washington and Moscow stretches back half a century, with New START serving as the most recent pillar of transparency and restraint. By capping deployed strategic warheads and mandating intrusive inspections, the treaty helped anchor crisis stability even as geopolitical tensions rose. Its expiration marks the first time in over 50 years that the two nuclear superpowers operate without a formal verification regime, reviving debates about how strategic uncertainty can be managed in a multipolar world.

Several forces now impede a direct replacement. The war in Ukraine has entrenched mutual suspicion, while domestic political coalitions in both capitals view concessions as politically toxic. Russia’s suspension of data exchanges has eroded the trust that verification mechanisms rely on, and its development of nuclear‑powered cruise missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles introduces technical gaps that a new treaty would need to address. Meanwhile, China’s rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal adds a third dimension; Moscow rejects trilateral talks, fearing dilution of its parity with the United States, and Beijing shows little appetite for formal constraints, leaving the U.S. to navigate a more complex strategic triangle.

Policymakers are therefore exploring pragmatic alternatives. Parallel political statements reaffirming New START limits could provide a stop‑gap, while modular agreements on specific issues—such as advance notification of strategic exercises or data sharing on new delivery systems—offer building blocks for broader stability. Reviving military‑to‑military hotlines and expanding crisis‑management channels can reduce escalation risk without treaty‑level negotiations. Finally, multilateral norm‑building initiatives that involve NATO allies and, where feasible, China, may foster a culture of transparency that compensates for the absence of a comprehensive treaty, preserving the essential benefits of arms control in an increasingly uncertain nuclear landscape.

Beyond New START: Prospects for U.S.–Russian Nuclear Arms Control

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