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HomeIndustryDefenseBlogsCould a Pacific War Be Lost in the Atlantic? Lessons From a USNI “Useful Fiction”
Could a Pacific War Be Lost in the Atlantic? Lessons From a USNI “Useful Fiction”
Defense

Could a Pacific War Be Lost in the Atlantic? Lessons From a USNI “Useful Fiction”

•March 6, 2026
Small Wars Journal
Small Wars Journal•Mar 6, 2026
0

Key Takeaways

  • •China uses DIME tools to erode Atlantic access
  • •US Navy faces logistics vulnerabilities in undersea cables
  • •Hundreds of PLA vessels could operate in Atlantic
  • •Atlantic disruptions threaten Pacific war sustainment
  • •Strategic maritime depth requires global network security

Summary

The U.S. Naval Institute’s "useful fiction" scenario imagines a future Pacific war with China that collapses because of coordinated attacks in the Atlantic. The article shows how Beijing could employ diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) tools to seize ports, undersea cables, and logistics hubs, crippling U.S. sea‑lines of communication. Hundreds of PLA‑affiliated vessels are depicted operating in the Atlantic, forcing the U.S. submarine force into defensive postures and threatening homeland security. The authors argue that America must protect its global maritime network, not just Pacific battlefields, to maintain strategic depth.

Pulse Analysis

The "useful fiction" narrative underscores a shift from a Pacific‑centric mindset to a truly global security posture. By mapping China’s long‑term DIME campaign across Africa and Latin America, the scenario reveals how incremental diplomatic and economic footholds can translate into decisive maritime leverage. When undersea cables and key ports are compromised, the United States loses the logistical arteries that sustain carrier strike groups and forward‑deployed forces, turning a regional contest into a systemic crisis.

In practice, the Atlantic emerges as a strategic chokepoint for power projection. The hypothetical presence of 150+ PLA‑aligned vessels illustrates how a peer adversary could saturate the ocean with surface and subsurface threats, forcing the U.S. nuclear submarine fleet into a defensive posture and diverting resources from the Pacific theater. Simultaneously, low‑tech tactics—such as dragging anchors to sever fiber‑optic cables—demonstrate that asymmetric attacks can produce outsized effects on command, control, and communications, jeopardizing both military operations and civilian infrastructure.

Policymakers and naval planners must therefore broaden basing and logistics concepts to encompass the Atlantic and its allied networks. Strengthening resilient, diversified supply chains, hardening undersea cable routes, and deepening NATO maritime cooperation are essential steps to safeguard strategic maritime depth. By integrating these measures, the United States can mitigate the risk of a Pacific war being lost in the Atlantic, ensuring that global naval dominance remains viable against a technologically sophisticated and globally ambitious China.

Could a Pacific War Be Lost in the Atlantic? Lessons from a USNI “Useful Fiction”

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