Deterrence Won’t Fail in the Taiwan Strait — It Will Be Bypassed

Summary

In this episode J. William DeMarco argues that recent Chinese military activities around Taiwan are less about rehearsing an invasion and more about a strategy of paralysis—using encirclement, law‑enforcement vessels, and limited rocket fire to create economic and political pressure without crossing a clear war threshold. He explains how Beijing exploits legal ambiguity, market reactions, and the island’s energy vulnerability to force accommodation, bypassing traditional deterrence that focuses on stopping a large‑scale amphibious assault. The guest draws on coercion theory, Mao’s protracted‑war concepts, and modern Chinese doctrine to show that the goal is to immobilize Taiwan and its allies, stretching decision‑making time until restraint becomes self‑reinforcing. DeMarco highlights the risks of this “quarantine” approach for both Taiwan and China, noting that it can undermine deterrence assumptions and create new escalation dilemmas.