Dutch Defence Secretary Boldly Claims F-35 Software Could Be ‘Jailbroken’
•February 15, 2026
0
Why It Matters
If European operators could bypass U.S. software controls, it would reshape defense autonomy and alter the commercial dynamics of the F‑35 program. Conversely, unauthorized changes could jeopardize access to critical upgrades and long‑term support.
Key Takeaways
- •Dutch official suggests possible independent F‑35 software modifications
- •F‑35 relies on U.S. updates and mission data files (MDFs)
- •Unauthorized changes risk loss of future upgrades and support
- •Code complexity exceeds 8 million lines, limiting hack feasibility
- •European parts still depend on trans‑Atlantic supply chain
Pulse Analysis
The Dutch defence secretary’s suggestion of a "jailbreak" for the F‑35 arrives amid growing friction between Washington and European allies. While the United States maintains strict control over software updates and mission‑data files, partner nations have long sought greater autonomy to safeguard national security interests. A move toward independent software capability would signal a shift in the balance of power, potentially prompting other NATO members to explore similar pathways and challenging the traditional export‑control model that underpins the program.
Technically, the prospect of modifying the F‑35’s software is far from straightforward. The aircraft’s codebase exceeds eight million lines, embedded with layered encryption, authentication protocols, and continuous integrity checks. Only Level‑1 partners such as the United Kingdom and Israel enjoy limited source‑code access; the Netherlands, classified as a Level‑2 partner, lacks direct code visibility. Even if a rogue modification were achieved, it could trigger a loss of eligibility for future upgrades, weapons integration, and critical security patches, effectively freezing the fleet in its current configuration.
Beyond software, the F‑35’s supply chain remains heavily anchored to U.S. production facilities. While European factories contribute components and final assembly, essential parts and the F135 engine still originate across the Atlantic. Any unilateral alteration could jeopardize these logistics, prompting the United States to restrict spares or halt further deliveries. For the broader defense market, such a rupture would raise questions about the viability of multinational platforms and could accelerate diversification toward indigenous or alternative fifth‑generation fighters.
Dutch Defence Secretary Boldly Claims F-35 Software Could Be ‘Jailbroken’
Addressing the F‑35’s operational independence from the U.S. amid tensions between Europe and the Trump administration, Secretary Gijs Tuinman made the claim to Dutch radio station BNR Nieuwsradio
Published February 15 2026
The bold claim, the veracity of which is unverifiable from an outside perspective, came as part of a wider dialogue over the operational independence of the F‑35 Lightning II – now the Netherlands’ only fighter aircraft.
Tuinman, who became State Secretary for Defence in July 2024, first reassured that, despite a rift opening between the current U.S. government and many European nations, the jury is still very much out on whether any moves – which would likely take the form of interrupting the supply chain and/or halting software updates – would be made that threaten the continued operation of the F‑35.
BIG: Dutch Defence Minister Gijs Tuinman hints that software independence is possible for F‑35 jets.
He literally said you can “jailbreak” an F‑35.
When asked if Europe can modify it without U.S. approval:
“That’s not the point… we’ll see whether the Americans will show… ”
— Clash Report, February 15 2026
We reported previously on this subject, pointing out that the simplistic “kill switch” concept that many claim the U.S. has for F‑35s is almost certainly fiction, but noting that reliance on the U.S. for the aircraft’s software updates, the vital mission‑data files (MDFs), and the sophisticated maintenance and supply‑chain system could present vulnerabilities without long‑term U.S. support.
“Not literally needed. But in time of crisis it’s vital to update the top‑level software, the mission data file (MDF). And on the F‑35, this can only be done in a USAF lab at Eglin AFB.”
— Bill Sweetman (@ValkStrategy), March 14 2025
Arguably, any such action by the U.S. government would ultimately be harmful to its own interests, damaging the reputation of overseas sales of U.S.–made products and making Europe’s overall air defences more vulnerable and more reliant on U.S. intervention – something the U.S. has repeatedly sought to avoid.
Tuinman then went on to say that, if the worst‑case scenario does come to fruition, he believes that, through unknown means, the F‑35’s software could be altered without permission by third‑party operators. He compared this directly to “jailbreaking” an iPhone, a process which allows end users to access features on iOS devices that are not usually allowed by Apple’s own software, at the cost of theoretically voiding the device’s warranty and opening up the risk of security vulnerabilities or software malfunctions.
Two Dutch F‑35 Lightnings patiently wait for their opportunity to maneuver into position to receive more fuel mid‑air from a KC‑135 Stratotanker over the Arctic Circle, May 31 2023. (Image credit: U.S. Air Force)
It is impossible to know whether Tuinman’s claims are accurate, nor where his information originated. It may have been relayed to him purely as a speculative endeavor, with actual work on identifying the concept’s feasibility yet to be undertaken. He explicitly refused to dive into any further detail on the subject, even noting that apparently it is not a subject he is supposed to speak on at all.
Given the increase in U.S.–Europe tensions, it would not be surprising that, at least on some level, this eventuality may have been considered by end users. Indeed, even during times of good relations these kinds of contingency plans are often developed just in case they may be needed. That said, the complexity of the F‑35’s source code – comprising over 8 million lines of code – and the likely extensive security measures undertaken to keep it secure and unmodified mean that such a task would almost certainly be far from simple.
F‑35 Software Complexities
There are conflicting statements across the lifetime of the F‑35 program about the amount of access close allies have to the aircraft’s source code. Of all operators, the closest any come to this level of access are the UK – the only Level 1 partner during the aircraft’s development and home of BAE Systems, which authored parts of the source code – and Israel, which uniquely has consent to independently modify and upgrade certain elements of its nation‑specific F‑35I “Adir” variant. Some code access was reportedly offered to Japan in 2019. The Netherlands, a Level 2 partner, is not known to have had any direct access.
A specially instrumented F‑35A Lightning II joining the 461st FLTS, F‑35 Integrated Test Force at Edwards AFB. Other than the F‑35I, all F‑35s worldwide rely exclusively on testing and development carried out by the U.S.–based Integrated Test Force. (Courtesy photo via USAF)
As well as being a complex technical undertaking, if a nation made unauthorised changes to its F‑35 aircraft it could be excluded from further official developments and upgrades should they become available again. Over the long term, this could leave the aircraft essentially frozen in its current configuration and unable to be adapted with new weapons, sensors, or other technologies. Crucially, access to updated MDFs could also be restricted, making the aircraft unable to correctly identify and protect itself from newer equipment operated by adversaries.
There is no guarantee that even if the aircraft could be “jailbroken” as Tuinman suggested, significant changes or upgrades could be made independently without the intrinsic knowledge of the aircraft and its systems available to the original manufacturers. Importantly, this software “fix” would not mitigate the effects of a freeze in the physical supply chain. While some F‑35 parts are made in Europe by the Netherlands and its allies, many parts are made only in the United States. European production lines do handle final assembly for the F‑35 as well as its F135 engine, but these lines rely on individual components being shipped across the Atlantic first.
A U.S. Marine Corps service member learns procedures for changing tires and inspecting brakes on the F‑35A Lightning II aircraft. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Caleb F. Butler)
This complex supply chain involves nations worldwide feeding into a central hub of spares and resources that is then coordinated and shipped to various operators with the assistance of the ALIS and ODIN systems. Nations manufacturing parts for the F‑35 simply deliver them to the global supply chain, and final delivery is then carried out to any location at any time it is required. This coordinated system is why a number of nations have resisted campaigns to restrict their supplies of F‑35 parts to Israel, as such restrictions would simply not be possible in the way the F‑35 program operates.
0
Comments
Want to join the conversation?
Loading comments...