Governments Need to Disrupt the Business of War Crimes: And No, Sanctions Are Not Enough

Key Takeaways

• War crimes generate massive, traceable financial footprints.
• AML frameworks can target proceeds as predicate offenses.
• Sanctions alone miss proxies and hidden asset structures.
• Coordinated typologies enable banks to flag illicit war‑profit flows.

Summary

The article argues that war crimes and other international atrocities function as lucrative enterprises, yet they are rarely pursued through financial investigations. It calls for extending the global anti‑money‑laundering (AML) framework to treat the proceeds of war crimes as predicate offenses, mirroring the approach used against drug trafficking and human trafficking. While sanctions have targeted known perpetrators, they miss the complex networks of proxies and shell companies that move illicit profits. The authors propose concrete steps—typology development, embedding financial investigation, and vigorous targeted sanctions—to close the accountability gap.

Pulse Analysis

War crimes are increasingly recognized as profit‑driven operations, from the Nazi-era industrialist trials to today’s exploitation of Ukrainian grain and reconstruction contracts. These activities leave a distinct financial trail that, if properly mapped, reveals the symbiotic relationship between armed forces, private contractors, and state‑linked enterprises. By treating the proceeds of such crimes as a distinct category of illicit revenue, policymakers can leverage existing AML tools to illuminate the hidden economics of conflict.

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) already mandates typology development for crimes like human trafficking and wildlife smuggling. Extending this methodology to war‑related profiteering would involve cataloguing red flags—such as rapid incorporation of shell companies in offshore jurisdictions, unusually large payments linked to reconstruction projects, or repeated transfers between sanctioned entities and unknown beneficiaries. Early examples, like the UK’s amber alert on South Sudan, demonstrate that tailored AML alerts can surface suspicious patterns before they embed deeper into the financial system.

Sanctions remain a vital instrument but are insufficient on their own; they target known individuals but often fail to capture the broader network of intermediaries. Embedding financial investigation into domestic and international war‑crime probes, coupled with vigorous, evidence‑based sanctions and asset confiscation, creates a comprehensive deterrent. With political will and coordinated resources, governments can transform AML regimes into a frontline defense against the business of war, reclaiming illicit wealth for victims and signaling that profiteering from atrocities will no longer be tolerated.