How Will the Type 26 Frigates Be Shared Between the Norwegian Navy and Royal Navy?

Why It Matters

Diverting Type 26 hulls weakens the Royal Navy’s near‑term ASW capability while Norway must trade frigates for its expanding submarine programme, affecting NATO’s northern defence posture.

Key Takeaways

• At least one Type 26 slated for Norway by 2029.
• Royal Navy may receive only five of eight planned frigates.
• BAE production time could halve after ship five, still slow.
• Norway balances frigate purchases against expanding Type 212CD submarine fleet.

Pulse Analysis

The UK’s decision to allocate one or more Type 26 frigates, currently under construction for the Royal Navy, to the Royal Norwegian Navy marks the most significant warship export deal for Britain since World War II. The move is framed as a boost to NATO’s northern flank, with eight British and at least five Norwegian ships expected to operate jointly in the High North. By earmarking ship 3 or 4 for Norway, the governments aim to meet Norway’s 2029 service‑entry requirement while preserving the strategic anti‑submarine warfare (ASW) capability that both navies rely on.

For the Royal Navy, the re‑allocation raises alarms because the fleet’s Type 26 programme already faces a £28 billion funding gap and a shrinking surface‑warfare force. BAE Systems predicts production times will drop from eleven to roughly five and a half years after ship 5, yet even this accelerated schedule cannot fully offset the loss of three to four hulls from the original eight‑ship order. A chronic shortage of mid‑career engineers and skilled tradespeople further hampers speed, meaning the RN could be left with as few as five operational Type 26s by the early 2030s, jeopardising its ASW posture.

Norway, meanwhile, is juggling its own naval priorities. The country originally sought five to six Type 26 frigates but has simultaneously expanded its order for German‑built Type 212CD submarines to six units, stretching its defence budget beyond the parliamentary ceiling. Cutting the frigate count to three could free funds for the submarines, but would reduce Norway’s surface‑warfare contribution to the Atlantic Bastion concept. The final split of the thirteen planned frigates will therefore hinge on diplomatic negotiations, with the RN’s operational needs argued to outweigh pure financial considerations.

How will the Type 26 frigates be shared between the Norwegian Navy and Royal Navy?

February 8 2026

This week, it was officially confirmed what had been obvious from the outset: at least one or more Type 26 frigates already under construction for the Royal Navy will be allocated to Norway. At a time when the RN frigate force is rapidly diminishing, here we consider the need to balance the strategic benefits of the deal with Norway against the UK’s dire need for new warships.

In a written parliamentary answer, Defence Procurement Minister Luke Pollard stated:

“We are assessing options for offering Type 26 build slots currently allocated to the Royal Navy to the Royal Norwegian Navy.”

He also added that “eight British and at least five Norwegian will operate jointly in Northern Europe, significantly strengthening NATO’s northern flank.”

Allocating at least one Type 26 frigate—likely ship 3 or 4 (HMS Belfast or Birmingham)—was accepted when the agreement was made between the two governments, as the Norwegians had stipulated their first vessel should be in service by 2029. To fend off competition from foreign shipbuilders that could also deliver vessels in this timeframe, this compromise was inevitable. While the government “assesses the options” for selling frigates originally intended for the UK to the Norwegians, there is mounting concern, given the RN’s urgent need for new ships. Offering as many as three ships from the original RN allocation is a very tempting option for the Treasury, as it would allow large bills to be pushed to the right. In line with MoD annual budgets, BAE Systems receives payments as milestones are reached in the programme, but the eight ships on order are a long way from being fully paid for. Normally, delaying or cutting procurement projects is made less attractive by the industrial and economic consequences, but in this case production in Glasgow would be conveniently unaffected.

With the £28 bn “black hole” in the equipment plan and a government that does not prioritise defence, there are even rumours that the RN might receive just five Type 26s, although eight is still the official line. The continued fumbling of the Defence Investment Plan (DIP) does not inspire confidence and potentially serious cuts or delays to MoD programmes could be on the way.

Norway – trading ships for submarines?

The Sjøforsvaret (Norwegian Navy) has consistently assessed that they need six capable ASW frigates. The initial agreement with the UK (subject to more detailed negotiation) was for at least five Type 26s with an option for one more. Although Norway benefits from a vast sovereign‑wealth fund built on hydrocarbon exports, left‑wing and Green politicians in the Storting (Parliament) oppose any spending above the 1 635 bn Kroner (≈ £123 bn) allocated for defence over the next 12 years. Revised costings reportedly show the plan to be under‑funded by more than 300 bn Kroner, following the recent decision to increase the order placed with TKMS in Germany for Type 212CD conventional submarines from four to six. The submarine capability is as strategically vital as the frigates, but there is speculation in the Norwegian media that the frigate numbers could be cut to three to fund the SSK acquisition.

Demonstrating the drawbacks of not having sovereign capabilities of your own, the Norwegians are in a similar delivery‑timetable negotiation with the Germans. TKMS has a very full order book with at least six boats on order for the German Navy, which also has an option for three more. The Type 212CD submarine is more than twice the displacement of the Ula‑class boats currently in service with the Sjøforsvaret. The first Norwegian boat is due to enter service in 2029 (image: Navy Lookout mock‑up).

Accelerating production?

The obvious solution to the rising demand for frigates would be for BAE Systems to accelerate delivery speed. There is already considerable dismay about the time it takes to build warships in the UK. HMS Glasgow will have taken at least 11 years from the first steel cut to becoming operational. This is a dire situation, but the reasons behind the glacial pace are complex and cannot be changed quickly, even by throwing money at the problem or opening more shipyards.

As a result of years of under‑investment in naval programmes, the enterprise was optimised for continuity at low rates rather than rapid output. BAE Systems (and Babcock) have made strenuous efforts recently to expand capacity, but the legacy of long design phases, strict cost control and low technical risk takes time to change. BAE Systems says that by ship 5, production time for a Type 26 will have been halved to 5½ years per ship. Still not especially impressive by foreign standards, but evidence that investment in people, facilities and learning from the first‑of‑class is paying off. Beyond ship 5, there may be other opportunities for efficiencies, reducing build time further.

The single most critical constraint is the shortage of skilled labour across the war‑ship and submarine construction enterprise. While headline investment has supported new halls, digital tools and refreshed strategies, these measures cannot compensate for gaps in human capital. Complex naval vessels demand experienced engineers, planners, supervisors and trades who understand naval standards, certification and the realities of integration. There is a finite number of experienced people available to be recruited and it takes many years to master these skills.

A particularly acute issue is the “missing middle” in the workforce. Over the past five years, apprenticeships and graduate intake have increased, creating a healthy pipeline of “digital‑native” junior staff who are generally learning fast. At the same time, the cohort of highly experienced older personnel is retiring or approaching retirement. What is missing is a sufficient number of mid‑career engineers, technicians and specialists with 10–20 years of experience. The staff in this category form the backbone of the organisation and are essential to delivering vessels on time, resolving production problems quickly and mentoring younger staff.

Blocks for ship 3, HMS Belfast, being consolidated in the new Janet Harvey Hall in Govan. Ship 4, HMS Birmingham, being constructed alongside (Photo: BAE Systems, July 2025).

Type 23s fading fast

It now seems quite likely that there may only be one or two Type 23 frigates left in service by 2030. Although excellent ships for their time, they have served the nation for far longer and in ways not envisioned when they were built.

Designed for an 18‑year service life, the Type 23s have managed to keep going for 30 years or more, with expensive life‑extension refits. Using light‑gauge steel to save weight and cost was justifiable at the time they were built, but this is a problem as the metal corrodes and fatigues. Expected to operate mainly in the cold North Atlantic, they spent a greater proportion of their careers serving in warmer climates where high humidity and heat combined with salt accelerate corrosion. Although patched up with multiple steel inserts, they are reaching a point where it is impossible to maintain the ship’s frames and keel. It is not obsolete combat systems that are hastening their demise, but rather the platform itself in danger of becoming unseaworthy.

While uncrewed systems and maritime patrol aircraft contribute, the frigate remains core to the ASW mission. There is little substitute for the power and effectiveness of the towed‑array system, combined with an expert ship’s company and Merlin helicopter.

Fine judgement

The recent Lunna House Agreement will see even closer defence cooperation between the UK and Norway. Together with the biggest warship export order since the Second World War, overall this is very positive for the Royal Navy and the UK as a whole. Norwegian Type 26s will be doing much the same primary task they would in RN service – hunting Russian submarines in the High North. A thirteen‑ship combined force operating as part of the Atlantic Bastion concept, heavily constraining Russian boats from the Bear Gap south and westwards, has the potential to be a very effective forward defence for both nations. There is a huge strategic and economic prize for Britain to grasp, but how the frigate delivery is split calls for fine judgement at a time of increasing pressure on both fleets.

Ideally, the delivery schedule would see the Norwegians receiving their ships over a longer period, maybe taking just ship 3 and ship 7 from the UK’s original allocation, which would allow the RN to recover its frigate strength sooner. This will be a matter for negotiation, but the strategic needs of the RN should be the priority ahead of financial considerations. Pressure must be maintained on the UK government to ensure a sensible and balanced delivery of the 13 frigates between the two navies and, above all, that the RN gets the eight it was promised.