ISF Voices 2026: Frozen Out: Taiwan’s Fight for Satellite Sovereignty

Key Takeaways

• Taiwan depends on 25 undersea cables; disruption would cripple economy
• Multi‑orbit plan includes OneWeb LEO, SES MEO, Astranis GEO, and D2C pilots
• Exclusion from ITU prevents Taiwan from filing spectrum coordination, leaving it vulnerable
• Proxy filings succeeded only for small GSO and research missions, not broadband
• Proposed interagency space council and ITU observer status could secure sovereign spectrum

Pulse Analysis

Taiwan’s digital economy hinges on a fragile undersea cable network that carries the majority of its data traffic. Recent cable faults—12 incidents in 2023 and four in early 2025—highlight the island’s exposure, especially for outlying regions that rely on just one or two links. To mitigate this risk, Taiwan has launched a layered satellite strategy that blends low‑earth‑orbit services from OneWeb, medium‑earth‑orbit capacity via SES’s O3b mPOWER, and geostationary micro‑satellites from Astranis, while also testing direct‑to‑cell connectivity with AST SpaceMobile. Though ambitious, the current terminal inventory of roughly 700 units falls far short of the millions needed for a full‑scale disruption scenario, underscoring the urgency of a sovereign capability.

The core obstacle is Taiwan’s non‑membership in the ITU, the body that coordinates radio‑frequency allocations and orbital slots. Without the ability to file an Advance Publication of Information, Taiwan cannot secure interference protection for its future Ku‑ and Ka‑band broadband constellations. Existing workarounds—such as the Singapore‑sponsored ST‑2A‑CK GEO satellite and the U.S.‑backed COSMIC‑2 LEO mission—only succeed for modest spectrum needs and cooperative partners. As megaconstellations like Starlink, Amazon Kuiper, and China’s Thousand Sails race to fill the most congested bands, Taiwan risks being forced to coordinate around pre‑registered Chinese systems, losing any leverage to defend its own spectrum equities.

A realistic path forward blends domestic and international reforms. Internally, Taiwan should create a high‑level space council, modeled on the U.S. National Space Council, to synchronize the Taiwan Space Agency, the Ministry of Digital Affairs, and the National Communications Commission around a unified filing strategy. Externally, it must cultivate ITU‑member allies willing to sponsor its filings and push for an observer or associate participant category that decouples technical coordination from UN membership. Even modest progress would give Taiwan a foothold in the global spectrum commons, preserving its satellite sovereignty and reinforcing regional stability as orbital resources become increasingly contested.