Rethinking Security Cooperation in the Age of Commercial Tech

Key Takeaways

• $250 billion foreign‑military‑sales backlog slows ally capability delivery
• Ukraine migrated terabytes of data to commercial cloud during invasion
• Congress' 2026 NDAA creates office to integrate commercial tech into sales
• Commercial AI and drones empower adversaries and non‑state actors
• New ecosystem needed to partner with civilian tech firms for rapid solutions

Pulse Analysis

The rapid diffusion of commercial technologies—from cloud computing to AI‑enabled sensors—has reshaped how modern militaries fight, and the U.S. defense establishment is beginning to recognize the gap. President Trump’s 2020 executive order and Section 1214 of the FY 2026 National Defense Authorization Act explicitly direct the Department of Defense to favor commercially available solutions whenever feasible. Proponents argue that civilian‑grade hardware can be fielded faster, at lower cost, and with open‑architecture designs that simplify integration with allied forces. This shift promises to keep the United States at the forefront of coalition warfare.

Yet the Pentagon’s security‑cooperation apparatus remains anchored to traditional platforms listed on the United States Munitions List. A $250 billion backlog in foreign‑military sales illustrates how production bottlenecks and lengthy certification processes delay critical capability transfers. Allies such as Ukraine have demonstrated the power of commercial tech, moving terabytes of data to the cloud and leveraging off‑the‑shelf analytics to close kill chains during the Russian invasion. Meanwhile, adversaries—from Russia to Iranian‑aligned militias—are exploiting the same commercial ecosystem, fielding AI‑driven logistics tools and weaponized drones at a fraction of the cost of legacy systems.

To preserve its role as partner of choice, the DoD must institutionalize a commercial‑technology‑first security‑cooperation strategy. Congress’s mandate to create a dedicated office, combined with proposals to expand the Defense Innovation Unit’s authority, could streamline procurement, create a vetted marketplace of civilian vendors, and fund technical expertise within foreign‑military‑sales teams. Training programs for security‑cooperation officers and Combatant‑Command experimentation authorities would reduce risk‑aversion and accelerate validation of dual‑use solutions. Without such reforms, cost‑prohibitive traditional weapons will drive allies toward competing suppliers, eroding burden‑sharing and weakening collective deterrence.