Trilateral Shipbuilding: Build a Missile Corvette...

Introduction

The balance of power in the Indo‑Pacific is shifting rapidly as China’s shipbuilding hegemony endures. With the U.S. shipbuilding base in decline, the United States must take bold action to remain a credible maritime power and uphold the rules‑based order that has underpinned peace and prosperity in Asia for decades. This order could be strengthened by a trilateral collaboration that unites the United States, Japan, and South Korea in co‑developing and mass‑producing a new class of fast‑attack missile corvettes. From the outset, these vessels would be designed with a clear value proposition for the high‑end fight, while also being tailored for maritime domain awareness and maritime security. They would bolster allied naval capacity and serve as an exportable platform to support ASEAN partners on the frontlines of illicit activity, maritime coercion, grey‑zone warfare, and great‑power competition.

To realize this initiative, the United States must reform outdated laws, attract foreign direct investment into dormant shipyards, and fully leverage the industrial strength of its allies. Congressional action, including targeted exemptions from the Jones Act, Buy American Act, and the Byrnes‑Tollefson amendment, will be essential to unlock collaboration at speed and scale. This bold strategy will counter the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s quantitative edge with a qualitatively superior, coalition‑driven maritime force, restoring American sea power while promoting Indo‑Pacific stability.

The Collapse of American Maritime Power

Since the conclusion of World War II, the United States has embarked on a mission to protect global supply lines, project power abroad, and strengthen a rules‑based order that would drive massive growth in the global economy—a feat not seen in human history.¹ This dominance was mainly at sea through the efforts of the U.S. Navy, which ensured freedom of the seas and adherence to this newfound order. Eight decades later, this dominance is being challenged as the Navy sails listlessly, if not rudderless, due to shrinking budgets, failed platforms, and floundering shipyards. During World II, the Navy had almost 1,300 ships in service; by 2003, it had less than 300.²

As fleet numbers dwindled due to the peace dividend, so did America’s shipyards. Since the late 1950s, U.S. shipbuilding output has declined by more than 85 %, and the number of shipyards capable of producing large commercial vessels has decreased by over 80 %.³ The U.S. has gone from building almost 5 % of the world’s ocean‑going ships in the 1970s to just 0.1 % today. For comparison, the People’s Republic of China, Japan, and South Korea make up almost 90 % of global shipbuilding, with the PRC building the majority.⁴

The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a sustained decline in America’s defense shipbuilding capacity. During the Cold War, the United States operated 11 shipyards dedicated to building naval combatants, but by 2005, seven shipyards were closed, and a once‑proud 70,000‑strong workforce was reduced to less than 30,000 workers (2012 estimate).⁵ Investment is now so poor that there are not enough drydocks in the U.S. to support naval expansion; for example, Norfolk Naval Shipyard’s Drydock 1 has been in use since before the Civil War, and the newest publicly owned dry dock for the Navy was completed in 1962.⁶ From 2010 to 2018, the PRC invested $132 billion in its shipbuilding capability, whereas the U.S. invested less than $80 million.⁷

Shipbuilding, shipyard infrastructure, and overall investment are not the only explanations for the Navy’s decline. Design failures and leadership missteps also played a role. Programs such as the Zumwalt‑class guided‑missile destroyer and the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) proved to be heavy burdens. The Zumwalt’s cost ballooned to $8 billion per ship, and its 155 mm Advanced Gun System projectiles cost $800,000 each.⁸ The LCS program, intended as a “multi‑mission jack of all trades,” cost more than $28 billion for 35 ships, with lifecycle operating costs projected at over $60 billion.⁹ Its anti‑submarine warfare package was canceled, and the mine‑hunting package only became operational in 2023, 15 years after development.¹⁰

In 2017, naval leaders shifted back to traditional guided‑missile frigates (FFGs), adopting the FREMM design. Extensive modifications reduced the design to barely 15 % of the original, delaying entry into service until 2029 and inflating cost to $1.4 billion.¹¹ Meanwhile, America’s strategic competitor continues to grow the world’s largest navy.

The Rise of PRC Shipbuilding Hegemony

China’s defense industrial base, especially its shipyards, has undergone an unprecedented transformation, making the PRC the world’s premier shipbuilder. With dual‑use (civilian‑military) shipyards, the PRC has roughly 230 times the shipbuilding capacity of the United States, capable of producing 23 million tons of vessels compared with less than 100,000 tons in the U.S.¹² The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been a primary beneficiary, evolving from a coastal defense force to the world’s largest blue‑water navy.

Since 2010, over 70 % of the PLAN’s fleet comprises newly commissioned vessels, including corvettes, frigates, destroyers, cruisers, submarines, and aircraft carriers. The Type 055 Renhai‑class cruisers, Type 052D Luyang III destroyers, Type 054B Jiangkai III frigates, and Type 056 Jiangdao corvettes represent formidable additions. The Renhai‑class carries 112 vertical launch system (VLS) cells capable of firing long‑range anti‑ship cruise and ballistic missiles such as the YJ‑18 and YJ‑21.¹³

The Type 054B frigate upgrades the Jiangkai series with a 32‑cell VLS and eight dedicated launchers for YJ‑83 anti‑ship cruise missiles.¹⁴ The smaller Jiangdao corvette, tailored for anti‑submarine warfare, can also “punch above its weight” when equipped with YJ‑83 missiles.

While the United States enjoys a qualitative edge in overall ship size and missile count—approximately 9,900 VLS cells versus China’s 4,200—the gap is narrowing. The PLAN already surpasses the U.S. in total ship numbers, fielding over 370 ships in 2024 compared with America’s 296 in 2025, and is projected to reach 475 battle‑force ships by 2035.¹⁵ Historical analysis shows that numerical superiority often proves decisive; only three out of 28 naval engagements from antiquity to the Cold War saw a smaller, technologically superior force prevail.¹⁶

In key areas such as anti‑ship missiles, the United States lags: the U.S. surface fleet relies on the SM‑6 (≈150 nm range), while the PLAN fields the YJ‑18 (≈300 nm) and the hypersonic YJ‑21 (≈540‑810 nm), plus a large arsenal of anti‑ship ballistic missiles.¹⁷ To counter this, the United States must partner with Japan and South Korea to co‑develop fast‑attack missile corvettes.

A Collaborative Approach

The shifting balance of power demands a fundamental reassessment of U.S. maritime strategy. Continuing on the current course risks ceding further influence to the PRC and undermining regional stability. Japan and South Korea possess world‑class shipbuilding expertise and share a vested interest in countering Chinese coercion.

In 2022, the PRC produced 1,794 ships, accounting for 61.4 % of the worldwide market and 55 % of backlog orders by 2024.ⁱ⁸ Japan, while only 15 % of the global market, delivered 587 large commercial vessels by the end of 2022.ⁱ⁹ South Korea accounted for 28 % of the market, producing 734 large commercial ships by the end of 2022.²⁰ The combined efforts of Japanese and South Korean shipyards, together with renewed U.S. investment, could raise the trilateral market share to over 50 %.

The Tri‑Lateral Solution: A Corvette for Asia

Collaboration in shipbuilding is complex, requiring a clear vision of future conflict, the appropriate combatant type, and resources to build at speed and scale. The United States faces time constraints, resource limitations, and the legacy of failed programs such as the LCS, Zumwalt, and the cancelled Constellation‑class frigate.

A viable path is to develop a cost‑effective corvette equipped with a vertical launch system (VLS). One design concept uses the Russian Steregushchiy III class as a template, blending its 12‑cell Redut VLS, anti‑ship missile launchers, and layered defenses with elements from Japan’s Mogami‑class (stealth, advanced sensors) and South Korea’s FFX Batch III (survivability, mission flexibility). Integrating a 24‑32‑cell Mk 41 VLS would enable long‑range surface‑to‑air, anti‑ship, and anti‑submarine missiles without the cost of a full destroyer.

Mass‑producing such corvettes would distribute naval fires across the first island chain, expand allied VLS inventory, and introduce a capability the PLAN lacks at this displacement. The European Union’s European Patrol Corvette (EPC) program provides a useful benchmark: a prototype by 2026‑27, operational units by ~2030, and projected costs of €250‑300 million per vessel.³⁹ Scaling this to a U.S.–Japan–South Korea effort suggests a 10‑year horizon with per‑ship costs of $275‑325 million, yielding 10‑12 hulls by year 12. Production could begin with 0‑4 years of design collaboration, lead ships arriving in years 4‑6, and serial production ramping up thereafter.

A trilateral corvette fleet could be offered to ASEAN partners, fostering “built‑in‑Asia for Asia” procurement, reducing delivery times, and enhancing strategic influence for Japan and South Korea while reaffirming U.S. commitment to the region.

Congressional and Legal Hurdles

Several bills aim to address foreign shipyard use and investment:

SHIPS Act – proposes a Strategic Commercial Fleet of 250 U.S.-flagged commercial ships and allows interim foreign‑built vessels.
Ensuring Naval Readiness Act – authorizes construction of U.S. combatants abroad in allied shipyards.

Both bills face obstacles from existing statutes:

Jones Act (1920) – requires ships sailing between U.S. ports to be U.S.-built and U.S.-owned.
Buy American Act (1933) – restricts significant components of naval vessels to domestic fabrication.
Defense Production Act (1950) – emphasizes strengthening the domestic industrial base.
Berry Amendment – gives preference to domestically produced goods.
Byrnes‑Tollefson Amendment – prohibits foreign companies from constructing hulls or superstructures for Navy ships.

Amending or exempting these statutes will be essential to enable a trilateral shipbuilding program.

Conclusion

The strategic imperatives facing the United States, Japan, and South Korea demand immediate, decisive action to secure enduring maritime security across the Indo‑Pacific. Trilateral collaboration in naval shipbuilding is no longer optional—it is necessary. By pooling resources, expertise, and industrial capacity, the alliance can design and produce a fast‑attack missile corvette tailored to regional needs: maritime domain awareness, deterrence, and enhanced interoperability.

Swift legislative action must accompany this vision. Congress must amend outdated laws—including the Jones Act, Buy American Act, and Byrnes‑Tollefson Amendment—to unlock foreign direct investment, reactivate dormant U.S. shipyards, and reestablish American leadership in global shipbuilding. Streamlining procurement and embracing trilateral trade rules can reduce costs, expedite production, and field the fleet before China’s projected advantage peaks later this decade. This strategy not only delivers ships but also redistributes burden‑sharing, strengthens alliance unity, and demonstrates a clear commitment to a free and open Indo‑Pacific.

Restoring sea power through this trilateral initiative is both an opportunity and a strategic necessity. Success will reaffirm U.S., Japanese, and South Korean leadership in safeguarding the maritime commons, strengthening the rules‑based order, and securing American interests throughout the twenty‑first century.

Chase Harding is a Strategic Planner at United States Forces Japan and a former Political‑Military Master’s Scholar at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Navy, Department of War, or the U.S. Government.

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