What Latin American Militaries Should Learn From Cuba, Ukraine, and Iran

Key Takeaways

• Cuba bought hundreds of drones to deter U.S. aggression
• Latin American forces lack clear missions, still buy prestige weapons
• Cheap munitions outweigh costly jets and ships for 21st‑century conflicts
• Regional procurement debates ignore strategic needs and supply‑chain risks
• Militaries should align budgets with counter‑insurgency and homeland security roles

Pulse Analysis

Cuba’s recent purchase of several hundred loitering‑munition drones marks a rare instance of a Latin American army aligning its procurement with a clearly defined strategic goal: deterring a possible U.S. incursion and protecting the regime. The move follows open‑source intelligence that the devices could reach Guantanamo Bay or even Florida, prompting Washington to reassess threat models that have traditionally focused on conventional forces. By studying Ukraine’s drone‑heavy warfare and Iran’s asymmetric tactics, Havana has demonstrated a pragmatic, cost‑effective approach that most regional militaries have yet to emulate.

Yet the same region continues to pour billions into prestige platforms—fighter jets, submarines, and main‑battle tanks—that offer little utility against the threats they are likely to face. Brazil’s submarine program, Peru’s F‑16 deal, and Colombia’s search for Kfir replacements illustrate a procurement mindset driven by status rather than operational relevance. These high‑value assets are vulnerable to modern anti‑access/area‑denial systems, as demonstrated by Iran’s navy and Russia’s Black Sea fleet in recent conflicts. Moreover, reliance on foreign supply chains exposes Latin American forces to abrupt embargoes, undermining readiness. The cost overruns also strain already fragile national budgets, diverting funds from health and education.

The lesson for policymakers is to re‑engineer defence budgets around ammunition, counter‑drone technology and adaptable infantry kits—items that can be produced locally and scaled quickly. Prioritising stockpiles of cheap munitions reduces the risk of early war attrition, a reality underscored by Ukraine’s experience and Cuba’s own doctrine. Aligning force structure with clear missions—whether counter‑insurgency, border security, or strategic deterrence—will also free resources for social programs that address the root causes of violence. For the United States, encouraging such a shift could lower the probability of escalation and create a more stable security environment across the hemisphere.