Build Partner Airpower, Not Air Forces

Why It Matters

The analysis underscores that effective partner airpower remains essential for U.S. irregular‑warfare strategy, shaping future force‑building investments and inter‑service responsibilities.

Key Takeaways

• USAF will eliminate two AvSFA squadrons in Latin America, Africa
• Past AvSFA efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan faced leadership gaps
• High‑tech platforms overwhelmed low‑capacity partner forces
• Sustainable logistics require long‑term U.S. maintenance support
• SOCOM proposed as lead for future partner airpower missions

Pulse Analysis

The recent decision to shutter two AvSFA squadrons has sparked debate about how the United States will continue to shape partner air capabilities in low‑intensity conflicts. While the cuts reflect budget pressures, they also reveal a broader strategic tension: the Air Force’s traditional role as the primary trainer versus the growing need for a more agile, joint approach. Historical case studies from Iraq and Afghanistan illustrate that when the Air Force attempted to lead these missions, it often struggled with coordination, resulting in fragmented training pipelines and duplicated effort.

Three recurring challenges emerge from the historical record. First, leadership ambiguity left partner nations without a clear point of contact, diluting the impact of advisory teams. Second, the introduction of sophisticated platforms—such as advanced avionics and precision‑guided munitions—proved counterproductive for low‑capacity states lacking the infrastructure to sustain them. Finally, without a long‑term logistics and maintenance framework, partner air forces quickly degraded, eroding the initial gains of capacity‑building. These insights suggest that future AvSFA initiatives must be calibrated to the operational realities of partner militaries, emphasizing simplicity, reliability, and sustained support.

Policy recommendations now focus on reassigning mission leadership to U.S. Special Operations Command, which brings a proven expeditionary mindset and tighter integration with partner forces. Acquisition strategies should prioritize “cheap, fast, and good enough” technology, ensuring that aircraft and support equipment are maintainable with existing local resources. Moreover, the emphasis should shift from building bureaucratic air force structures to delivering combat‑ready airpower that can be directly employed against insurgent threats. By aligning organizational responsibility, technology choices, and logistical commitments, the United States can preserve its strategic advantage in irregular warfare while avoiding the pitfalls of past AvSFA efforts.