China's Information War Turns Taiwan’s Own Voices Against It

Why It Matters

The operation seeks to erode Taiwanese morale and deter U.S.‑backed defense investments, raising the risk of a non‑kinetic escalation in cross‑strait tensions. Understanding the scale of this disinformation campaign is critical for policymakers and tech platforms defending democratic information environments.

Key Takeaways

• 560,000 Douyin videos posted by 1,076 CCP accounts in Q4 2025
• 2,730 clips featured 57 Taiwanese figures; 13 were KMT members
• Top KMT leader Cheng appeared in 460 videos, generating 5 M interactions
• Monthly airtime of Taiwan‑related clips rose 164% to 369 minutes
• Taiwan recorded 45,000 fake accounts and 2.3 M disinfo pieces in 2025

Pulse Analysis

China’s disinformation strategy has moved beyond generic propaganda to a sophisticated “voice‑of‑the‑enemy” model, hijacking Taiwanese opposition leaders and influencers to lend credibility to anti‑DPP narratives. By flooding Douyin with over half a million videos in a single quarter and then cross‑posting them to platforms popular in Taiwan, Beijing creates a feedback loop that blurs the line between domestic dissent and foreign manipulation. The data, supplied by the Taiwan Information Environment Research Center, reveals a 164 % jump in monthly airtime for Taiwan‑focused content, underscoring the campaign’s rapid escalation.

The strategic intent is twofold: to delegitimize President Lai’s push for a $40 billion defense boost and to sow psychological fatigue among the electorate. Featuring familiar faces—such as KMT chair Cheng Li‑wun, who appeared in 460 clips and amassed more than 5 million engagements—makes the messaging resonate more deeply than overt state propaganda. Analysts argue that this “cognitive warfare” aims to convince Taiwanese citizens that resistance is futile, thereby reducing public pressure on the government to procure additional U.S. weapons.

Taiwan’s response combines media‑literacy training for the armed forces with a broader civil‑defence information campaign, while Western platforms face scrutiny over their role in amplifying repackaged content. For U.S. and allied policymakers, the surge in Chinese‑sponsored disinformation signals a need to bolster resilience measures and coordinate with tech firms to disrupt the supply chain of inauthentic narratives. As the information front intensifies, the risk of a miscalibrated escalation grows, making the battle for perception as consequential as any kinetic maneuver.