Force Multipliers in the Americas

Why It Matters

SFA provides a low‑cost, flexible tool to shield U.S. borders and blunt rival influence, especially China’s economic leverage, in a region increasingly tied to homeland threats.

Key Takeaways

• 2025 NSS designates Latin America as a serious U.S. security concern
• SFA can address both state and non‑state threats at modest cost
• Army Security Cooperation Group—South, SOF, and Guard partnerships reinforce each other
• Integrated SFA aims to curb drug‑related corruption and Chinese influence
• Existing authorities lack mechanisms to counter partner nations’ economic coercion

Pulse Analysis

The 2025 National Security Strategy elevated Latin America from a peripheral concern to a focal point of U.S. security planning. Rapidly shifting alliances, the rise of transnational criminal networks, and the encroachment of Chinese economic projects have created a volatile environment where traditional diplomatic tools alone are insufficient. Security force assistance—long used to build partner capacity—offers a scalable, cost‑effective lever that can address both conventional and irregular threats while reinforcing U.S. strategic interests.

Within this framework, the report highlights three complementary instruments. The Army Security Cooperation Group—South (formerly the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade) provides a dedicated conventional force to train and equip host‑nation militaries. Special‑operations forces add a rapid, high‑skill element for counter‑terrorism and illicit‑trade interdiction. Meanwhile, the National Guard State Partnership Program leverages long‑term, sub‑national relationships to embed U.S. expertise in civil‑military institutions. When synchronized, these assets can disrupt drug‑trafficking corridors, reduce corruption, and blunt Beijing’s influence operations without large fiscal outlays.

However, the authors warn that existing legal authorities are ill‑suited to confront economic coercion—a primary tool of Chinese power projection. To close this gap, policymakers may need to expand SFA mandates, integrate economic‑security expertise, and develop joint interagency frameworks. Doing so would not only protect U.S. border security but also signal a durable commitment to a stable, partner‑led Latin America, reinforcing the broader U.S. strategic posture in the Western Hemisphere.