A weakened NPT regime could spark a new wave of nuclear weapon development, destabilizing regional security and raising the risk of nuclear conflict worldwide.
Since its inception in 1970, the Nuclear Non‑Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been the cornerstone of global efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. By binding the recognized nuclear‑weapon states to disarmament commitments and restricting access to fissile material, the treaty helped keep the number of nuclear arsenals low for decades. Only three states—India, Israel and Pakistan—pursued weapons outside the treaty framework, and North Korea’s breach remains an outlier. This relative stability fostered confidence in multilateral arms‑control regimes and underpinned the post‑Cold War security architecture.
By 2026, that architecture is fraying. The United States, once the principal guarantor of the NPT, is scaling back multilateral engagements and emphasizing bilateral security arrangements. Simultaneously, China and Russia are expanding their strategic influence, while regional powers reassess the perceived value of nuclear deterrence amid heightened great‑power rivalry. These dynamics erode the unity that previously constrained proliferation, making technical safeguards easier to bypass and political costs of weaponization appear lower. Iran’s escalating rhetoric and its potential departure from the treaty exemplify how weakened collective resolve can accelerate proliferation pathways.
Policymakers now face a narrow window to reinforce the non‑proliferation regime before additional states cross the threshold. Strengthening export‑control networks, revitalizing diplomatic dialogues within the NPT review conferences, and offering security guarantees to volatile regions could restore some of the lost cohesion. Moreover, investing in advanced detection technologies and fostering regional nuclear‑free zones would raise the cost of clandestine programs. If the international community fails to adapt, the risk of a fragmented nuclear landscape will rise, threatening global stability and increasing the probability of nuclear use.
In 2026, a Growing Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Thu, 02/05/2026 - 15:53
With the risks of new nuclear-armed States on the rise, the nuclear non-profileration regime is in danger of collapse. In 2026, Iran will continue to dominate the headlines as the most likely country to exit the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or develop nuclear weapons in violation of its treaty obligations. Beyond Tehran, however, additional countries are likely to move closer to weaponization as debates about the security value of nuclear deterrence intensify and technical barriers to proliferation erode.
For decades, since the NPT entered into force in 1970, international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons proved remarkably successful. Although three countries—India, Israel, and Pakistan—developed nuclear arsenals outside of the NPT, only North Korea developed the bomb in violation of its NPT obligations. Several factors contributed to the success of nonproliferation efforts, including unity among the nuclear-weapon States in responding to proliferation threats, sustained efforts to limit the spread of technologies necessary for weaponization, and the perceived security value of the NPT.
The U.S.-led international order created a geopolitical environment conducive to these multilateral efforts to prevent proliferation. That order, however, is collapsing. In its place, a new, more dangerous geopolitical environment is emerging. Marked by fraying alliances, aggressive great-power competition, and a U.S. retreat from multilateralism, this new order could lead to a new era of proliferation, as additional States debate the value of nuclear weapons.
Read the full OpEd, published Feb. 5, 2026 at Just Security.
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