Iran War Is Accelerating SE Asia’s Drift From America

Why It Matters

Reduced US influence in ASEAN undermines Washington’s ability to shape Indo‑Pacific security, while a tilt toward China could reshape regional trade and defense architectures.

Key Takeaways

• Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore now prefer China over US, per 2026 survey
• US‑Indonesia defence talks stalled over US over‑flight rights in Malacca
• Energy shock from Iran‑US conflict hits ASEAN, 56% crude from Middle East
• ASEAN nations seek diversified partners beyond US and China, including Japan, Australia
• Declining US credibility fuels regional shift toward strategic flexibility

Pulse Analysis

The escalation of hostilities between Israel and Iran has reverberated far beyond the Middle East, striking at the core of Southeast Asia’s strategic calculus. With the Strait of Hormuz under threat, the region’s reliance on Middle‑Eastern crude—accounting for more than half of its oil imports—has translated into volatile energy prices and heightened inflationary pressure across ASEAN economies. At the same time, Washington’s perceived inability to shield its Gulf partners has eroded confidence among regional capitals, prompting policymakers to question the reliability of the US security umbrella that underpinned Indo‑Pacific stability for decades.

Survey results from the ISEAS‑Yusof Ishak Institute’s State of Southeast Asia 2026 reveal a subtle but meaningful pivot: 52 % of respondents now view China as the preferred partner, edging out the United States. The shift is most pronounced in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, where majorities favor Beijing, while the Philippines remains an outlier with stronger US ties. These numbers signal a growing perception that Chinese economic initiatives and diplomatic outreach better align with ASEAN’s immediate interests, a trend that could translate into deeper defense cooperation and infrastructure investment if left unchecked.

Faced with an uncertain US commitment, ASEAN governments are broadening their strategic portfolios, courting Japan, Australia, India, the United Kingdom and the European Union for complementary capabilities. This diversification reduces dependence on any single great power and creates a hedge against geopolitical volatility. For Washington, the challenge is twofold: restore credibility through consistent, multilateral engagement and offer tangible security guarantees that address energy resilience and maritime freedom. Failure to adapt may accelerate a de‑Americanization of the Indo‑Pacific, reshaping trade routes, supply chains and the regional balance of power.