Memo to the President: Steps to Secure a Prosperous, US-Aligned Venezuela
•February 3, 2026
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Why It Matters
The proposal ties U.S. strategic interests to Venezuela’s democratic transition, offering a pathway for investment and regional security while limiting adversarial influence.
Key Takeaways
- •Set quarterly benchmarks for Rodríguez reforms.
- •Release political prisoners, close El Helicoide facility.
- •Disband colectivos, secure Russian-made weapons.
- •Implement debt restructuring, transparent monetary policy.
- •Push free elections with independent judiciary.
Pulse Analysis
The United States has long viewed Venezuela as a strategic flashpoint in the Western Hemisphere, and the recent capture of Nicolás Maduro has opened a narrow window for policy recalibration. Washington’s memo leverages this moment to propose a phased engagement strategy that pairs humanitarian concessions—such as freeing political detainees and shutting down notorious torture sites—with security demands, including the disarmament of colectivos and the containment of Russian‑supplied air‑defense systems. By setting clear, time‑bound benchmarks, the U.S. signals both resolve and flexibility, aiming to persuade Caracas to adopt reforms without appearing overly coercive.
Economic revitalization sits at the core of the plan, recognizing that any democratic transition must be underpinned by fiscal credibility. The memo urges Venezuela to adopt transparent monetary policies, restructure its $170 billion debt, and reopen banking channels under strict guardrails, thereby restoring investor confidence. A renewed hydrocarbons framework and targeted stimulus for impoverished households are presented as prerequisites for attracting private capital and ensuring that oil revenues benefit the population rather than the regime. These steps are framed as mutually beneficial: a stable Venezuelan economy reduces migration pressures and curtails illicit financing that fuels regional criminal networks.
If executed, the roadmap could reshape regional dynamics, limiting the foothold of Russia, China, Iran, and Cuba while fostering a pro‑U.S. ally on the continent’s northern edge. However, roadblocks such as slow investment flows, entrenched security actors, and the risk of a superficial regime change remain. The memo recommends reopening the U.S. embassy, coordinating with Colombian forces, and establishing transitional‑justice mechanisms to address past human‑rights abuses. By coupling diplomatic engagement with enforceable conditions, Washington seeks to transform Venezuela from a source of instability into a partner capable of contributing to hemispheric security and economic growth.
Memo to the president: Steps to secure a prosperous, US-aligned Venezuela
TO: POTUS
FROM: Jason Marczak, Ambassador (ret.) • James Story, General (ret.) • Laura J. Richardson • Geoff Ramsey
SUBJECT: Steps to secure a prosperous, US‑aligned Venezuela
What do world leaders need to know? Our “Memo to…” series has the answer with briefings on the world’s most pressing issues from our experts, drawing on their experience advising the highest levels of government.
Bottom line up front: In the wake of Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro’s January 3 capture, the United States government can advance long‑term goals by making the tough asks up front; time will decrease pressure on Delcy Rodríguez to make critical reforms. Clear benchmarks should be set for what Rodríguez must agree to do in the first three, six, nine, and twelve months. Washington should urgently address structural economic and security issues while laying the conditions for free and fair elections where the result will be respected.
First priority: Set clear benchmarks for what Delcy Rodríguez should do this year
In addition to economic reforms, the United States should push Rodríguez to take the following actions:
Stop torture and surveillance
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Release all political prisoners immediately, and further in line with the newly announced amnesty law, guarantee that the arrest of political dissidents ceases immediately and that all Venezuelans can return to the country and exercise their fundamental human rights without risk of repression.
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Ensure that the El Helicoide torture facility quickly closes, as promised in the January 30 amnesty announcement.
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Abolish the use of the Chinese‑designed Carnet de la Patria (Homeland Card) as a tool of political control; distribution of public goods must be transparent, de‑politicized, and respectful of privacy rights.
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Eliminate all forms of malign surveillance, including technology provided and operated by China National Electronics Import & Export Corporation.
Tackle security concerns
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Identify and remove non‑diplomatic personnel, including military trainers, from countries that pose risks to US security interests such as Russia, Iran, Cuba, and China, and from internal spoilers such as the FARC and ELN guerrilla groups.
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Disband the colectivos paramilitary groups, provide the United States with assurances that the colectivos will not operate, and understand that the Venezuelan government will be held responsible for all actions the colectivos take.
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Collect and warehouse all shoulder‑fired anti‑aircraft missiles, anti‑ship missiles, drones, and other offensive capabilities. Surveillance of the warehoused weapons should be shared between the government in Caracas and the United States.
Restore the rule of law
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Provide a timeline for reforms that can restore the independence of the legislative and judicial branches and ensure the rule of law, a condition needed for ramping up foreign investment as well as democratic governance.
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Begin a process for hiring new judges that is fair and independent, so that private investors will trust that their interests are being protected and that Venezuelans can regain confidence in the judiciary.
Allow political freedom
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Lift the ban on running in elections from opposition leaders such as María Corina Machado.
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Prevent the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) from disrupting, disbanding, and controlling opposition political parties.
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Create a commission to outline a path toward free and fair elections within eighteen months. The commission should include representatives from the government, the internationally recognized winners of the 2024 presidential election, leadership of the democratic opposition as represented in the Unitary Platform coalition and other opposition parties, and civil society.
Lift media controls
- Stop media censorship and allow Venezuelans free access to the internet and all international media, including US broadcasts.
Long‑term priority: Build a prosperous, secure, democratic Venezuela
Although there currently exists a unique momentum to rebuild Venezuelan democracy, it will take years of consistent international support for local reforms to create lasting change. Yet, the moment requires urgent action from Washington to lead the country in that direction. Rodríguez might welcome change that includes some reforms and modernization under the ruling PSUV, but she and others who wield power will likely resist a full‑scale transition to democracy. The eventual goal must be free and fair elections, the results of which are respected. That is also the best vehicle for investor certainty in the country’s long‑term political trajectory.
Address structural economic issues to attract real investment
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The Venezuelan government must commit to transparency. Clear and open communication as a policy will prevent the current government from making back‑door deals and will lay the groundwork for creating an attractive investment environment in Venezuela.
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It also must put a strong focus on monetary policy reform. Venezuela’s economy is unofficially dollarized, and the International Monetary Fund estimates the inflation rate is 682 percent. Achieving price stability is a crucial step to long‑term economic stability.
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Venezuela must lay out a plan for its $170 billion debt to be paid back, which would be a positive signal for potential investors. Repaying that debt will be nearly impossible without undertaking debt‑restructuring measures with help from multilateral banks, but doing so would indicate the country will remain solvent going forward. The banking sector also needs reforms to make it possible for investors to get money in and out of the country.
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The government needs an economic stimulus designed for the benefit of the Venezuelan people. Approximately 73.2 percent of Venezuelan households live below the poverty line; 36.5 percent live in extreme poverty. The government also needs financing plans for social sectors that consider basic infrastructure needs, including facilitating the shipment of food and medicine from the United States and elsewhere to begin to alleviate the humanitarian crisis.
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The oil sector will need to be rebuilt. A new hydrocarbons framework—recently approved in the current National Assembly—is an important start for that purpose. The US push for investment is important, assuming it puts forward the local conditions and long‑term assurance that international corporate commitments will be respected. The Venezuelan people must benefit from these revenues rather than see them stolen by the regime.
Takeaway: Venezuela’s economic situation is worse than dire. The United States must push for transparency and anti‑corruption measures from the current government while advancing economic negotiations such as debt restructuring to foster investment.
Reform the security sector
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The Venezuelan government must establish a functioning state security system under clear constraints and oversights. The lines between security forces and illegal armed groups in Venezuela are blurry. The repression apparatus used by the regime includes non‑state actors such as pro‑government armed paramilitary organizations known as colectivos.
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The United States must work to counter the influence of Russia, Iran, Cuba, and China in Venezuela. Washington should work with Caracas to consolidate and control the five thousand Russian‑made man‑portable air‑defense systems (MANPADS) in Venezuela. Access and control over weapons factories, including those that manufacture missiles, military drones, and firearms, should be part of a stability‑operations plan.
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The United States should continue to build a sustainable readiness force in the region to support stabilization efforts while proposing a detailed plan for the future role of the Venezuelan military.
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Colombia’s military should also be enlisted to help in certain operations to root out illegal groups that frequently cross the border, restricting drug and illegal arms flows.
Takeaway: The United States should consolidate control of Russian and Iranian arms and weapons systems in Venezuela that could be used for spoiler or repression activity. It should also push regional partners to minimize illegal activity and reduce the power of violent actors in Venezuela during this time of rapid change.
Advance institutional reform and elections as a baseline for prosperity
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As the United States moves towards reestablishing formal diplomatic relations with Caracas, it will need to define and press for an eventual end state in Venezuela that will serve US interests and those of the Venezuelan people.
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The United States should push party leaders and the current government to see elections as competitive, not as an existential threat to their political survival. This requires a clean slate for elections: new National Electoral Council rectors, new judicial authorities, a new legislature, and international help in ensuring that eventual elections are credible. Visible steps from the regime on restoring political rights and security guarantees within the first six months are essential.
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The United States should pressure Venezuela to hold a national contest, conducted by an independent legislative commission made up of different members of Venezuelan society such as judicial experts and academics, to elect new judges to the Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo de Justicia).
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An independent judicial body should publicly codify contract protections and dispute‑resolution mechanisms. A new, independent judicial system can begin respecting contracts between the government and private‑sector actors, a precondition for serious capital inflows.
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Finally, the United States should press for transitional‑justice mechanisms. Venezuela is currently facing investigations before the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity committed in the context of state repression. Any transition must guarantee the right of victims and their families to truth, justice, reparation, and guarantees of non‑repetition.
Takeaway: Institutions in Venezuela need to be reimagined and rebuilt with the end goal of economic recovery and a prosperous democratic civil society in mind. The judiciary must enjoy independence from the executive to protect Venezuelans and investors.
Potential roadblocks and recommended actions
Roadblock: Investment comes slower than anticipated.
Action: The United States should allow for the reopening of normal banking channels with specific guardrails, and ensure that all business conducted by the current authorities maintains transparency. Debt‑restructuring conversations should include bondholders and multilateral institutions; the sanctity of contracts between commercial and governmental actors needs to be respected, and legal reforms fast‑tracked to protect those contracts.
Roadblock: Little change on the ground for the population in Venezuela.
Action: In addition to steps to protect political freedom and disarm violent actors, the United States must continue monitoring the local situation, which would be made easier by reopening the US Embassy. US support to reopen the economy should translate into tangible benefits for households. The United States should demand guarantees that Venezuelans who want to return—especially opposition members—will not face threats or maltreatment and can fairly participate in popular discourse and elections when the time comes.
Conclusion
President Donald Trump has a historic opportunity to bring Venezuela back in line with US security and economic interests in a way that can simultaneously benefit the Venezuelan population. Current US plans are already moving in that direction and creating a legacy in building Venezuela’s long‑term future as a potential US ally. This is a moment to ensure that reforms are made sustainable and that an updated version of the same failed regime does not take root.
About the authors
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Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. He has twenty‑five years of expertise in regional economics, politics, and development, and established the Council’s body of work on Venezuela in 2017.
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Ambassador (ret.) James Story served as both ambassador and chargé d’affaires to Venezuela from 2018 to 2023. He is now a non‑resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.
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General (ret.) Laura J. Richardson was commander, US Southern Command, from 2021 until November 2024, and is a member of the Atlantic Council Board of Directors and the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center Advisory Council.
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Geoff Ramsey is the senior Latin America threat‑intelligence analyst at Recorded Future and a non‑resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.
We thank Colette Capriles and Carmen Beatriz Fernandez for their insights that contributed to this publication. Special thanks to Ilona Barrero for her help in drafting this memo.
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