Myanmar Is Not ‘in Transition’: War by Other Means and the Risks of Policy Drift

Why It Matters

Misreading Myanmar’s power dynamics risks policy drift that fuels the junta’s survival, while targeted support for the resistance can shift the balance toward democratic outcomes and regional stability.

Key Takeaways

• IISS report downplays Myanmar's federal democratic resistance.
• SCEF controls roughly one‑third of Myanmar’s territory.
• Resistance alliances have degraded junta’s logistics and manpower.
• Chinese aid bolsters junta’s drones and ammunition access.
• Foreign policy must shift from elite engagement to long‑term resistance support.

Pulse Analysis

The International Institute for Strategic Studies’ recent brief frames Myanmar’s current crisis as a stalled elite transition, echoing the narrative that dominated the 2010s reforms. This perspective overlooks the decisive role of grassroots and ethnic resistance movements that have historically driven change. By focusing on the junta’s internal power plays, analysts risk advising policies that merely legitimize a regime that shows no willingness to cede authority, thereby perpetuating a diplomatic dead‑end.

In reality, the Steering Committee for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF) and its youth‑led partner, the Spring Revolution Alliance, now dominate about 33% of Myanmar’s landmass, spanning key border regions with China, India and Thailand. Their coordinated operations have forced the Tatmadaw into a defensive posture, disrupting supply lines and curtailing major offensives such as Operation 1027. Simultaneously, Beijing’s increased military aid—enhanced drone fleets and ammunition shipments—has given the junta a temporary tactical edge, creating a precarious equilibrium where civilian casualties surged to 518 in March 2026, the deadliest month since the 2021 coup.

For Washington and its allies, the strategic choice is clear: continue the ineffective elite‑only engagement or pivot to a sustained, bottom‑up partnership with the federal democratic resistance. Long‑term assistance should prioritize governance capacity in liberated areas, humanitarian relief, and diplomatic platforms that amplify SCEF’s voice regionally. By refusing to normalize relations with Min Aung Hlaing’s regime, the international community can help tilt the conflict toward a federated democratic future, reducing the risk of a protracted, destabilizing stalemate.