New Wargame Assessed USAF Force Mixes for a China Fight

Why It Matters

The findings highlight a strategic gap in the Air Force’s current modernization trajectory, suggesting that without a faster, deeper‑strike‑focused mix the U.S. may lack the ability to counter a Chinese offensive in the Western Pacific. This has direct implications for defense budgeting, force structure, and the broader U.S. deterrence posture.

Key Takeaways

• Team Mitchell’s mix adds bombers, drones, and F‑47s for deep strikes
• Current USAF plan (Team Doolittle) lacks sufficient long‑range strike capability
• Both teams face high attrition from Chinese missile attacks on forward bases
• Wargame recommends shifting resources from Army to Air Force for Pacific conflict
• Organic kill chains using B‑21s and F‑47s reduce reliance on external systems

Pulse Analysis

The United States faces an accelerating strategic contest with China, especially around Taiwan, where air power will be decisive. A recent unclassified wargame hosted by the Air & Space Forces Association’s Mitchell Institute simulated a 2035 conflict, pitting two hypothetical Air Force force mixes against a Chinese invasion. Team Doolittle mirrors the current modernization plan, while Team Mitchell incorporates a more aggressive blend of bombers, collaborative combat drones, and the upcoming sixth‑generation F‑47. By modeling deployment, attrition, and strike sequencing, the exercise provides a rare data‑driven glimpse into how force composition shapes operational outcomes.

The simulation revealed stark contrasts. Team Doolittle, reliant on legacy fighters and standoff munitions, could not generate sufficient deep‑penetration strike packages, limiting its ability to disrupt Chinese reinforcement efforts. In contrast, Team Mitchell’s emphasis on long‑range platforms such as B‑21 bombers and F‑47s enabled "organic kill chains" that reduced dependence on vulnerable external networks. Both teams, however, suffered heavy losses from Chinese missile attacks on forward‑deployed aircraft, underscoring the trade‑off between proximity to the theater and survivability. The wargame’s conclusion that attrition would outpace sortie generation for either mix signals a pressing need to rethink basing and defensive measures.

Policy makers are urged to reallocate resources from ground‑centric capabilities toward a balanced Air Force that can project power across the first and second island chains. Recommendations include accelerating procurement of B‑21s and F‑47s, bolstering Pacific base defenses, and integrating space‑based ISR with organic strike assets. For defense contractors, the findings translate into heightened demand for next‑generation stealth bombers, autonomous combat drones, and resilient command‑and‑control systems. Ultimately, the wargame underscores that without a decisive shift toward long‑range, high‑end strike capacity, the U.S. may struggle to maintain a credible deterrent against a determined Chinese offensive.