Nuclear Powers Are Expanding Their Arsenals Instead of Disarming. Australia Doesn’t Have to Be Complicit in This

Why It Matters

The conference’s failure weakens the NPT’s credibility, heightening the risk of a renewed global arms race and forcing non‑nuclear states like Australia to reassess their security commitments.

Key Takeaways

• NPT 2026 review produced no consensus, marking third consecutive deadlock.
• US and Russia tested intercontinental missiles; Russia used hypersonic weapon on Kyiv.
• France expanded nuclear‑armed aircraft to cover eight European nations.
• Australia hosts US B‑52 bombers and future nuclear‑capable submarines under AUKUS.
• Experts urge Australia to sign the nuclear weapons prohibition treaty.

Pulse Analysis

The latest review of the Nuclear Non‑Proliferation Treaty (NPT) exposed a stark reality: the grand bargain that once balanced disarmament with peaceful nuclear cooperation is unraveling. Since its indefinite extension in 1995, only two of the nine review conferences have produced substantive outcomes, and 2026 saw delegates walk away empty‑handed. This pattern reflects a broader shift in global arms control, where the absence of enforceable timelines for nuclear disarmament allows the five recognized nuclear powers to prioritize modernization over reduction, fueling skepticism among non‑nuclear states.

Meanwhile, the United States, Russia, and France have accelerated their strategic postures. Both the US and Russia launched intercontinental ballistic missile tests, signaling confidence in their deterrent capabilities. Russia’s use of a hypersonic missile in Ukraine and its invitation to Belarus for nuclear exercises illustrate a willingness to blur the line between conventional and nuclear threats. France’s decision to extend its nuclear‑armed aircraft umbrella to eight European nations further expands the reach of its arsenal. These moves collectively raise the specter of a new arms race, characterized by faster, more accurate, and stealthier weapons that challenge existing non‑proliferation frameworks.

For Australia, the stakes are immediate and political. Hosting US B‑52 bombers at RAAF Base Tindal and preparing ports for nuclear‑capable submarines under the AUKUS pact embed the nation within a nuclear logistics chain, despite its official non‑nuclear stance. Critics argue that this “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy undermines Australia’s professed support for the NPT and exposes the region to heightened nuclear risk. Signing the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons would provide a concrete legal anchor for disarmament advocacy, signaling a break from reliance on US nuclear guarantees and reinforcing Australia’s role as a responsible actor in global arms control.