The UK and Trump’s National Security Strategy

Why It Matters

Europe and the UK must assume heightened defence responsibilities as the U.S. redirects resources eastward, reshaping transatlantic security dynamics and influencing global power balances.

Key Takeaways

• U.S. strategy prioritises national interest over global leadership
• Western Hemisphere pre‑eminence replaces European focus
• Indo‑Pacific posture intensifies US military presence
• Economic security linked to defence and critical minerals
• UK expected to lead Euro‑Atlantic security gap

Pulse Analysis

The Trump‑era National Security Strategy marks a stark departure from the post‑Cold War consensus that positioned the United States as the guarantor of a rules‑based international order. By foregrounding "America First," the document narrows the scope of U.S. engagement to issues directly tied to national interest, while still retaining the willingness to use force in regions like the Western Hemisphere. This recalibration reduces the emphasis on collective security mechanisms in Europe, signaling to allies that Washington will no longer shoulder the bulk of strategic burdens.

For the United Kingdom and its European partners, the strategy translates into an urgent call for deeper defence integration and autonomous capability development. With Washington concentrating on the Indo‑Pacific and reinforcing its presence against China and Taiwan, Europe faces a strategic gap in the Euro‑Atlantic theatre. The UK, already investing in advanced naval and cyber assets, is positioned to fill this void, but it will require sustained political will, budgetary commitments, and a clear vision of leadership within NATO and the broader security architecture.

The broader geopolitical context underscores a shift toward power‑based diplomacy, where economic resilience and supply‑chain security become integral to national defence. The strategy’s focus on reviving American industry, securing critical minerals, and countering predatory trade practices reflects an understanding that economic strength underpins military capability. As China tightens its grip on rare‑earth markets and Russia deepens its Eurasian alliance, European states must diversify supply sources and bolster domestic production to maintain strategic autonomy. In this evolving landscape, the UK’s ability to navigate both security and economic challenges will be pivotal for sustaining a stable, Western‑led order.

The UK and Trump’s National Security Strategy

By Peter Alan Dutton

The current Trump administration’s new National Security Strategy can best be described as a sober look in the mirror by the American administration to realistically observe the state of the nation and its readiness to assert global influence. Having looked in the mirror, the strategy suggests the United States needs a major make‑over. Put in that context, there is a framework of logic to the new National Security Strategy that seeks to reinvigorate American capacity to address the nation’s most fundamental security interests, to assert global influence, and to build stronger alliances to exercise global leadership together.

Whether the administration follows the strategy in its international undertakings is another matter. Donald Trump has been described as a President who seeks under all circumstances to preserve as much decision space for the oval office as possible. Translation? His decisions may be mercurial and will not always align with the strategy. But the strategy should nonetheless serve as a general guide to how the broader administration will conduct policy. Now, having had time to process and reject some of the strategy’s clearly objectionable rhetoric, it is time to ask what is the Trump administration’s strategic framework, and what are the implications for the United Kingdom and for Europe?

The US National Security Strategy

The strategy’s framework has five core elements.

1. National‑interest focus. The United States will focus more narrowly on national interest than on global leadership. “In everything we do, we are putting America First,” President Trump declares. He faults the “elites” of previous administrations for “shouldering burdens” and following policies for “which the American people saw no connection to the national interest.” National interest and global leadership are not entirely unrelated, so this is more a matter of a shift in emphasis than a sharp departure from the past. Past security strategies emphasized system maintenance and the idea of American indispensability to a stable global system; this administration acknowledges the limits of American power and will prioritize involvement only in issues that bear most directly on the national interest. The strategy professes a predisposition for non‑intervention, which does not mean Trump eschews the use of force to achieve American objectives. Iran, Somalia, Nigeria and now Venezuela can all attest to that. However, Trump campaigned on a promise to avoid long, costly wars in peripheral regions that drain American resources and achieve little in terms of the direct national interest, and this strategy seems to reaffirm that policy.

2. Western Hemisphere pre‑eminence. The United States intends to “restore American pre‑eminence in the Western Hemisphere.” The strategy “readjusts” US military presence, “expands” regional networks, “protects strategic points,” and “develops” the region’s strategic resources. Nothing in the recent interventions in Venezuela should therefore come as a surprise.

“The strategy seeks to stabilise great‑power relations, which is a significant shift from the escalating competition that marks previous security strategies.”

3. Stabilising great‑power relations. The strategy seeks to reset relations with China and Russia. It rejects American global domination but promises to prevent global or regional domination by others, even as it acknowledges the special or “outsized” leadership role of larger, richer, and stronger nations. The document does not mention the word “rules” once. In a notable tonal shift, it uses the word “competitive” only five times (all in reference to business practices) and “compete” only three times, contrasting sharply with the Biden administration’s strategy, which used those terms far more frequently.

4. Indo‑Pacific posture. The fourth and perhaps most significant element is the shift in the American military’s global posture. Since Hillary Clinton first introduced the concept of rebalancing toward Asia in her October 2011 Foreign Policy article, three presidents and four successive administrations have pursued it. The United States will “keep” the Indo‑Pacific free and open, “preserve” freedom of navigation, “maintain” secure supply chains, “deter” conflict over Taiwan, and “deny” aggression anywhere in the first island chain. This signals a continued, beefed‑up presence in East Asia.

   In stark contrast, the only verb used to describe the American strategy for freedom and security in Europe is “support.” While Europeans are expected to take a more significant, even leading, role in deterring Russia, the strategy also pledges to “work with allies and partners to maintain global and regional balances of power to prevent the emergence of dominant adversaries.”

5. Economic reinvigoration. The strategy focuses heavily on reviving the American economy through balanced trade, reindustrialisation, a revived defence industrial base, access to low‑cost energy, and protection of the financial sector. It emphasizes “independent and reliable access to goods we need to defend ourselves and preserve our way of life,” including expanding access to critical minerals and countering predatory economic practices. Given China’s near‑stranglehold on rare‑earth supplies and its attempts to drive other countries out of automobile manufacturing, economic strength is framed as essential to national security.

Where are Europe and the UK?

What are the implications for the United Kingdom and for Europe?

• Global affairs are at an inflection point. Russia, China and now the US, to varying degrees, reject an international order based primarily on international law and are pursuing power‑based policies until a new order emerges. It is unlikely that a future US administration will return to a strategy centred on a rules‑based order. Law and power have long co‑existed in the international system; the balance is now tipping toward power.

• The United Kingdom and Europe are being pushed to assume greater responsibility for Euro‑Atlantic security. This trend has been developing for at least 15 years, but today the stakes are higher because China’s power continues to grow and the Sino‑Russian entente creates a unified Eurasian security system. Any major power war anywhere now implicates the security interests of the UK and Europe. The UK is well‑positioned to exercise greater leadership in Euro‑Atlantic affairs and will inevitably be called upon to do so. The US will not leave a complete vacuum of leadership or military power in Europe as it focuses on the eastern end of Eurasia, but Europe will need to act quickly to ensure stability on Eurasia’s western end.

---

Peter Alan Dutton is a Guest Contributor at RUSI.