The US Has Been Burning Through Weapons in Iran It Could Need in a War with China. Here Are the Latest Estimates.

Why It Matters

Depleted missile stocks could constrain U.S. options in a potential Pacific war against China and force tough allocation choices among multiple theaters, undermining deterrence and alliance support.

Key Takeaways

• US expended >50% of pre‑war stocks of four key munitions
• THAAD interceptors fell from ~360 to roughly 70 remaining
• Tomahawk launches top 850, cutting inventory by about 28%
• Replacing JASSMs, PAC‑3, THAAD will take 4‑5 years each
• Congressional funding needed for production ramps to meet future demand

Pulse Analysis

The Iran conflict has acted as a stress test for America’s high‑end missile arsenal. Seven systems—ranging from THAAD and Patriot PAC‑3 interceptors to Tomahawk cruise missiles and JASSMs—saw usage rates that wiped out more than half of pre‑war stocks for four of them. Analysts at CSIS note that while the United States still possesses enough missiles to finish the Iran operation, the rapid drawdown has exposed a chronic shortfall that predates the war. The data underscore how quickly a limited pool can be exhausted when multiple theaters demand the same precision weapons.

In response, the White House and defense contractors have pledged to dramatically boost production. Lockheed Martin plans to lift THAAD output to 400 units annually, RTX will raise Tomahawk and SM‑6 rates above 1,000 and 500 per year respectively, and Patriot PAC‑3 capacity is slated to increase by 2030. Yet these ramps hinge on congressional appropriations and the inherent lag of complex manufacturing lines. Even at accelerated rates, replacing the lost stockpiles will take four to five years, a timeline that overlaps with ongoing support for Ukraine and other allies, creating competition for limited output.

Strategically, the depletion matters most for a prospective conflict with China. The Pacific theater would demand both long‑range strike missiles to penetrate hardened targets and robust missile‑defense interceptors to counter China’s growing ballistic‑missile capability. With inventories already below the levels deemed sufficient for a peer‑competitor fight, the United States may face hard choices about where to allocate scarce munitions. Policymakers must weigh accelerated funding, alternative procurement pathways, and potential stock‑pile sharing with allies to preserve deterrence credibility in the Indo‑Pacific.