Transnational Organized Crime in Mexico: Continuity, Change, and Uncertainty Under the Sheinbaum Administration (Part I)

Why It Matters

Understanding the evolving criminal network is crucial for designing effective security reforms and mitigating spillover risks to the U.S. and regional stability.

Key Takeaways

• 190k homicides by 2024 set high violence baseline
• Sinaloa and CJNG control 100+ and 350+ municipalities
• Crime now includes extortion, fuel theft, kidnapping, smuggling
• Judicial reform elects judges, raising independence concerns
• Diversified criminal networks blunt single‑issue enforcement

Pulse Analysis

Mexico’s 2024 political realignment gave President Claudia Sheinbaum a constitutional majority, but it also handed her a security apparatus burdened by a historic homicide surge. The legacy of more than 190,000 killings underscores the depth of institutional fragility—weak investigative capacity, endemic impunity, and a justice system riddled with political capture. As the new government pushes far‑reaching judicial reforms, including the popular election of judges, the risk of further politicization looms, potentially undermining the very legitimacy the changes aim to restore.

Beyond the headline‑grabbing drug cartels, organized crime in Mexico now thrives on a portfolio of illicit activities. Extortion, fuel theft, kidnapping, and migrant smuggling generate revenues that often eclipse traditional drug profits, especially in regions where local mafias dominate. This diversification is a rational response to intensified border enforcement and the renewed Trump‑era hardening of U.S. borders, which raises the cost of single‑market dependence. Criminal groups hedge risk by operating across multiple illicit economies, blurring the line between transnational syndicates and locally embedded bands, and rendering narrow, drug‑focused policies increasingly ineffective.

The implications for policy are profound. A network‑centric view of organized crime suggests that fragmented enforcement will continue to miss the adaptive, multi‑layered structures that sustain violence. Effective reform will require coordinated federal‑state action, robust safeguards for judicial independence, and cross‑border collaboration that addresses both transnational smuggling routes and the domestic markets that fuel local criminal enterprises. Failure to adapt could lock Mexico into a cycle of violence that destabilizes communities, threatens U.S. security interests, and erodes public confidence in democratic institutions.