Trump’s War Exposes the Weakness of Middle Powers

Why It Matters

The piece highlights that middle‑power coalitions cannot reshape the international system when great powers act unilaterally, signaling limited leverage for smaller states in current geopolitical contests.

Key Takeaways

• Trump's unilateral actions expose middle powers' limited influence on global order
• Canada's call for a middle‑power bloc quickly unraveled after Iran strike
• Diplomatic groups act independently, offering only a multilateral veneer
• Great‑power rivalry, not middle‑power cooperation, drives Gulf crisis outcomes

Pulse Analysis

The notion of a middle‑power agenda resurfaced at Davos when Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney urged nations like Canada, Australia and the Netherlands to band together against "bullying" by the United States and China. Historically, scholars have credited middle powers with niche diplomatic influence, but Carney’s call coincided with a volatile period marked by President Donald Trump’s confrontational stance toward allies and his willingness to use force unilaterally. The February U.S.-Israel strike on Iran and the subsequent push to reopen the Strait of Hormuz tested the viability of any collective middle‑power response, revealing a stark lack of shared threat perception.

In practice, the middle‑power response splintered into a patchwork of initiatives: Pakistan and China floated a joint mediation proposal; Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan convened a regional consultation; the International Crisis Group mobilized civil‑society actors; and Britain hosted a virtual summit of roughly 40 nations. Rather than converging on a common strategy, these groups pursued divergent national interests, effectively providing a multilateral veneer for U.S. objectives. The United Nations Security Council further underscored the power imbalance, with Russia and China abstaining or vetoing resolutions that sought to curb U.S. actions, leaving little material impact on the ground.

The episode underscores a broader reality: as long as the United States and China dominate the strategic calculus, middle powers remain structurally dependent on the great‑power order they can critique but not reshape. Their diplomatic efforts may signal vitality, yet without a unifying adversary or shared vision, they lack the capacity to alter outcomes in high‑stakes crises. Policymakers in middle‑power capitals should therefore recalibrate expectations, focusing on niche influence and coalition‑building around specific issues rather than aspiring to reshape the core of the international system.