U.S. Air Force Looks for a Second Builder of Its Best Strike Missiles

Why It Matters

Diversifying the missile supply chain reduces strategic risk and supports expanding U.S. and allied demand for long‑range strike capability. A second source could accelerate production rates and lower costs for critical defense programs.

Key Takeaways

• Air Force seeks U.S. second source for JASSM and LRASM production
• Lots 27‑31 (JASSM) and 13‑17 (LRASM) target 2031‑2036 deliveries
• No foreign participation; only American firms may submit white papers
• Lockheed Martin currently holds sole‑source tooling, raising entry barriers
• Increasing NATO demand and Pacific threats drive urgency for competition

Pulse Analysis

The Joint Air‑to‑Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) and its maritime variant, the Long‑Range Anti‑Ship Missile (LRASM), are among the most sophisticated long‑range strike weapons in the U.S. arsenal. Both carry a 450‑kg (1,000‑lb) warhead and can reach targets up to 925 km (575 mi) away, leveraging GPS, infrared, and advanced seeker technologies. Their stealthy profiles and multi‑platform compatibility—spanning B‑1B, B‑2, B‑52, F‑16, F‑15E and F‑35 aircraft—make them indispensable for penetrating defended airspace and neutralizing high‑value naval assets.

Rising demand from NATO allies, spurred by Ukraine’s conflict, and the Pentagon’s focus on countering China’s expanding navy have amplified the need for higher production volumes. Relying on a single supplier, Lockheed Martin, poses a strategic vulnerability: any disruption could stall deliveries at a time when rapid replenishment is critical. By soliciting a second domestic source now, the Air Force aims to mitigate supply‑chain risk, potentially drive down unit costs, and ensure a resilient pipeline for the next decade of missile production.

However, the barrier to entry is formidable. Replicating Lockheed’s specialized tooling, test equipment, and classified software infrastructure would require billions in capital investment and years of development. Prospective competitors must demonstrate not only manufacturing expertise but also the ability to secure and manage sensitive technology. If an American firm can meet these hurdles, the defense industrial base could see a shift toward greater competition, fostering innovation and possibly reshaping procurement strategies for future precision‑strike programs.