US Unlikely to Convince China to Join New Nuclear Arms Control Agreement, Experts Say

Why It Matters

China’s refusal would leave the world’s two largest nuclear powers outside a unified arms‑control regime, raising strategic instability and complicating non‑proliferation efforts.

Key Takeaways

• China views nuclear parity as core security, resists binding limits
• US hopes for multilateral treaty after New START expires in 2026
• Experts cite verification challenges and geopolitical mistrust as barriers
• Absence of Chinese participation could undermine global non‑proliferation regime
• Washington may shift focus to bilateral risk‑reduction measures instead

Pulse Analysis

The United States is racing to fill the gap left by the 2026 expiration of the New START treaty, the cornerstone of U.S.–Russia nuclear limits. Policymakers in Washington hope to craft a broader, multilateral agreement that would include China, the world’s third‑largest nuclear arsenal. Proponents argue that a three‑power pact could curb an emerging arms race and set verification standards for emerging nuclear powers. However, the diplomatic push arrives at a time of strained U.S.–China relations, where trust deficits make any concession difficult.

China’s strategic calculus centers on maintaining a credible deterrent against the United States. Beijing insists that any treaty must recognize its security concerns and avoid caps that could limit its future modernization. Verification remains a sticking point; Chinese officials fear intrusive inspections could reveal sensitive capabilities. Moreover, domestic political narratives portray nuclear restraint as a concession to a rival, making leadership reluctant to appear weak. These factors, combined with broader geopolitical frictions over Taiwan and technology, reinforce China’s hesitancy to join a new arms‑control framework.

The implications of China’s non‑participation are profound. Without the world’s two biggest nuclear powers in a single treaty, global non‑proliferation architecture risks fragmentation, and the risk of miscalculation may rise. The United States may pivot to bilateral confidence‑building measures, such as hot‑line upgrades and risk‑reduction protocols, while continuing to pressure allies for a unified stance. Analysts suggest that a pragmatic, step‑by‑step approach—starting with transparency initiatives rather than binding limits—could eventually create the conditions for broader engagement, but the road ahead remains uncertain.