(Just Like) New START Is Over

The February 5 expiration of the New START treaty marked the end of the last formal bilateral limits on strategic nuclear forces between the United States and Russia. Negotiated under Obama and extended once, the treaty’s demise leaves Washington and Moscow without a legally binding cap on deployed warheads, a situation not seen since the early 1970s when SALT II failed ratification. While both sides have signaled a willingness to respect the treaty’s numerical ceilings, the absence of a written framework removes the verification mechanisms that once provided transparency and stability in the nuclear relationship.

To bridge the gap, U.S. and Russian officials reportedly reached a six‑month “handshake” understanding that each will not exceed the former New START limits. The agreement, however, contains no agreed definitions or inspection regime, effectively allowing either side to “upload” warheads from reserve stockpiles to operational systems. Analysts note that submarine missile tubes, previously reduced from 24 to 20, could be re‑enabled, and land‑based ICBMs could be equipped with multiple warheads, potentially adding hundreds of warheads to the deployed force without new production. This ambiguity raises concerns about rapid, unchecked force growth.

The broader strategic picture is complicated by President Trump’s push to involve China in any future arms‑control framework, a move many experts label a “poison pill.” Including Beijing would dramatically raise the ceiling for all parties and could trigger a classic yo‑yo arms race, where mis‑timed force expansions spiral into costly competition. Predictability, rather than sheer numbers, is essential to avoid the oscillations that plagued the 1960s missile‑gap era. Policymakers therefore face a choice: negotiate a multilateral treaty that restores verification and limits, or risk a new era of unchecked nuclear buildup across the U.S., Russia, and China.