Mission Impossible? What It Would Really Take to Secure Iran’s Nuclear Material with Expert Andy Weber

Andy Weber explains that Iran’s underground sites conceal roughly 440 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium, enough for a dozen nuclear weapons. The material sits deep in the Isfahan tunnels, which were bombed during Operation Midnight Hammer. Recovering it would resemble a small‑scale mining project: earth‑moving gear, protective suits, and a force of low‑thousands to secure the area for weeks. By contrast, Weber’s 1993 Project SAFIRE in Kazakhstan succeeded because the host government cooperated, allowing a 30‑person team to package 600 kilograms of 90% HEU and load it onto two C‑5 aircraft within six weeks. The Iranian environment lacks that permissive backdrop, turning a technical extraction into a massive logistical and security nightmare.

Given the operational hazards, Weber advocates a diplomatic route. The 2015 JCPOA demonstrated that Iran could relocate low‑enriched uranium to Russia with its cooperation, establishing a clear precedent. A negotiated agreement—potentially mediated by Pakistan—could move the 60% HEU to a neutral third country where it would be blended down to reactor‑grade fuel, eliminating the immediate weapons‑grade threat. This approach avoids the high‑risk ground incursion, reduces the chance of accidental release of toxic chemicals like hydrofluoric acid, and sidesteps the political fallout of a large U.S. troop deployment inside Iran.

Weber also warns that the broader nuclear landscape is becoming more volatile. The resurgence of tactical nuclear weapons, championed by Russia and hinted at by the United States, blurs the line between conventional and strategic conflict, raising the probability of miscalculation and accidental escalation. Iran’s pursuit of enrichment appears driven more by national prestige than by an urgent need for a bomb, suggesting that diplomatic incentives—such as sanctions relief—could be more effective than military force. Policymakers should prioritize negotiated removal of the HEU, reinforce non‑proliferation norms, and resist expanding the tactical nuclear arsenal, which would weaken deterrence rather than strengthen it.