Enemies in Agreement: A Virtual Book Talk with Dr. Jane Vaynman

Why It Matters

Understanding how to craft adaptable arms‑control frameworks can prevent expensive arms races and reduce strategic instability, directly shaping U.S., Russian, and Chinese security policies.

Key Takeaways

• New START expired, ending last US‑Russia bilateral verifiable arms control treaty
• Domestic political volatility creates conditions for states to negotiate arms control
• Arms‑control agreements vary widely in verification intensity and design flexibility
• Perceived adversary cheating undermines willingness to enter new agreements
• Tailored, lower‑monitoring deals can curb costly arms races without full treaties

Summary

The conversation centers on the February 5 2026 expiration of the New START treaty, the final bilateral, verifiable arms‑control pact between the United States and Russia. Host Heather Williams and Johns Hopkins scholar Dr. Jane Vaynman explore why such agreements emerged during the post‑Cold‑War “golden age” and what the loss of New START means for future security architecture.

Vaynman argues that arms‑control deals are rare because the security dilemma is usually intense; they only materialize when states perceive a mild dilemma, stable domestic politics, and mutual confidence in defensive postures. Her research maps a spectrum of agreements—from highly intrusive verification regimes to minimal information exchanges—and shows how power asymmetries, conflict termination timing, and domestic volatility shape that spectrum.

A striking quote from the book underscores the point: “Arms control is rare because of the pervasiveness of the security dilemma.” She also highlights the current narrative that U.S. restraint under New START contrasted with Russian and Chinese advancements, noting that without a formal treaty, it is difficult to judge whether such moves constitute cheating or simply independent development.

The takeaway for policymakers is that arms control is not dead but in a “hibernation” phase. Flexible, lower‑monitoring arrangements can still curb costly arms races, preserve relative stability, and free resources for other priorities. Designing such tailored instruments will be crucial as great‑power competition intensifies and new technological domains emerge.

Original Description

Please join the CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues on Tuesday, April 21st at 3:30 pm for a virtual discussion with Dr. Jane Vaynman, Assistant Professor of Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), on her new book, Enemies in Agreement: Political Volatility and the Design of Arms Control (Cambridge University Press, 2026).

Enemies in Agreement examines how uncertainty, particularly that arising from domestic instability, can create the conditions for arms control. The book identifies two pathways to arms control: one in which states hedge against uncertainty through lightly monitored arms control agreements and the second in which states attempt to lessen the impacts of deception by negotiating and implementing heavily monitored arms control agreements. Dr. Vaynman’s book draws from a range of methods and sources, including a comprehensive statistical analysis of arms control agreements as well as in-depth case studies rooted in archival research. Her work carries important lessons for policymakers especially given the recent expiration of New START and multiple U.S. administrations’ efforts to enter into arms control negotiations with China.

This event will be moderated by Dr. Heather Williams, Director of the Project on Nuclear Issues and Senior Fellow in the Defense and Security Department at CSIS.

This event is made possible through general support to CSIS.

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