Birthright Citizenship Re-Examined (From an Originalist Perspective)

Key Takeaways

• Ramsey defends broad 14th Amendment citizenship interpretation
• Lash and Wurman propose narrower originalist readings
• Trump’s 2025 order targets children of undocumented visitors
• Supreme Court to review birthright citizenship in Barbara v. Trump
• Congress could reshape jurisdiction via Section Five power

Summary

Michael Ramsey’s upcoming Notre Dame Law Review article revisits the originalist debate over the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause, defending a broad interpretation that grants citizenship to virtually everyone born in the United States. The paper critiques narrower readings proposed by Kurt Lash and Ilan Wurman, who argue the clause should exclude children of undocumented or non‑permanent‑resident parents. Ramsey concludes that the clause’s language encompasses all persons born under U.S. jurisdiction, except diplomatic children and, historically, tribal Native Americans. The discussion is heightened by President Trump’s 2025 executive order and the pending Supreme Court case Barbara v. Trump.

Pulse Analysis

Michael Ramsey’s forthcoming Notre Dame Law Review article revisits the long‑standing originalist dispute over the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause. Building on his 2020 work, Ramsey systematically dismantles the narrower constructions offered by scholars Kurt Lash and Ilan Wurman, arguing that the clause’s plain language—‘All persons born… in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof’—covers every individual born on U.S. soil under sovereign authority, except for children of foreign diplomats and, at the time of adoption, tribal Native Americans. By anchoring his analysis in the amendment’s public meaning, Ramsey reinforces the conventional, expansive view of birthright citizenship.

The debate has acquired fresh urgency after President Trump’s 2025 executive order sought to deny citizenship to children of temporary visitors and undocumented residents. Lash’s proposal would exclude offspring of unlawfully present parents, while Wurman limits the guarantee to children of lawful permanent residents, both aiming to legitimize the order. Ramsey counters that neither position aligns with the original text, emphasizing that ‘subject to the jurisdiction’ already excludes diplomatic families but includes all other birth‑situated persons. This clash illustrates how originalist methodology can produce divergent policy outcomes when scholars prioritize different historical sources.

With the Supreme Court slated to hear Barbara v. Trump this spring, Ramsey’s reaffirmation of a broad citizenship clause could shape the Court’s reasoning and the nation’s immigration landscape. Even if the Court upholds the status quo, the discussion raises a secondary question: whether Congress can use its Section Five enforcement power to redefine jurisdiction and thereby narrow birthright citizenship. To date, Congress has taken no legislative steps, leaving the issue for future legislative debate. Stakeholders—from advocacy groups to state policymakers—must monitor how constitutional interpretation, executive action, and potential congressional reforms intersect in this evolving legal arena.