The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was drafted without explicit economic freedoms, leaving it largely ineffective as a tool for promoting interprovincial trade. Supreme Court decisions have narrowly interpreted Section 6(2)(b) as a limited right to work without residency, and Section 7 as protecting personal liberty rather than economic activity. As a result, the Charter does not drive economic integration the way U.S. or EU courts have. Future judicial shifts appear unlikely, keeping economic integration dependent on legislative and intergovernmental measures.
When the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was adopted in 1982, its drafters focused on civil and political liberties rather than market freedoms. Unlike the United States Constitution, which the Supreme Court has used to protect economic activity, or the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights that underpins the single market, the Canadian Charter contains no standalone economic right. The result is a constitutional framework that offers little leverage for challenging provincial trade barriers or restrictive regulatory schemes, leaving economic integration to be governed primarily by legislation and intergovernmental agreements.
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence reinforces this narrow view. In *Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker* (1984), Section 6(2)(b) was interpreted as a right to work “subject to the laws and practices of general application,” not a free‑standing economic liberty. Subsequent decisions, such as *Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. Richardson* (1998) and *Black v. Law Society of Alberta* (1989), confirmed that only discriminatory effects breach the provision. Section 7, which guarantees life, liberty and security, has been repeatedly held to protect personal dignity rather than occupational choice, as seen in *Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act* (1985) and the short‑lived *Wilson v. BC* (1988) ruling.
Because the Charter provides scant economic protection, interprovincial trade and labour mobility in Canada depend on political negotiation and statutory reform rather than constitutional litigation. This limits the ability of businesses to challenge protectionist measures and slows the emergence of a de‑facto single market comparable to the United States or the European Union. Scholars suggest a “renewed understanding” of Section 6 could arise, but absent a clear judicial shift, policymakers must rely on cooperative federalism and targeted legislation to advance economic integration.
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