A Year Later – What Did the Pause on FCPA Enforcement Do?

Key Takeaways

• DOJ convictions fell; SEC civil actions hit zero in 2025
• SEC FCPA unit disbanded, agency staff cuts widespread
• Guidelines restrict cases to cartels, security threats, direct harm
• Sanctions on foreign corrupt actors lifted without justification
• U.S. anti‑corruption influence markedly diminished internationally

Summary

In February 2025 the Trump administration halted implementation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, prompting a sharp decline in both DOJ criminal convictions and SEC civil actions. The SEC’s dedicated FCPA unit was disbanded, staffing cuts hit the DOJ fraud section and FBI, and the department issued narrow enforcement guidelines focusing only on cartels, direct economic harm, national security, or clear corrupt intent. Simultaneously, the United States reversed sanctions on several foreign officials previously flagged for corruption, signaling a broader retreat from anti‑corruption leadership. While a 2026 DOJ case shows the law remains on the books, overall enforcement capacity has been dramatically reduced.

Pulse Analysis

The pause on FCPA enforcement has reshaped the U.S. anti‑corruption landscape. After a 118‑day suspension, the Department of Justice’s fraud division continued to secure convictions, but at a fraction of the volume seen over the previous decade. The Securities and Exchange Commission, once a co‑enforcer, recorded no civil actions in 2025 and dissolved its specialized FCPA unit. New DOJ guidelines now channel resources toward transnational criminal organizations, direct economic injury to U.S. firms, national‑security threats, and clear individual intent, effectively narrowing the scope of future investigations.

For corporations, the shift creates a paradoxical compliance environment. While many firms maintain internal controls, the perceived drop in enforcement diminishes the incentive to self‑report violations, especially given the five‑year statute of limitations that could expose past misconduct under a future administration. Voluntary disclosures have already dwindled, and companies may weigh the cost of robust compliance against the likelihood of detection. This uncertainty can embolden firms with lax anti‑bribery programs to test the limits, potentially increasing illicit payments abroad.

Internationally, the United States’ retreat reverberates through multilateral anti‑corruption forums. The removal of sanctions on individuals in Paraguay, Hungary, and the Western Balkans, coupled with the dismantling of USAID’s anti‑corruption programs, signals a reduced willingness to pressure foreign actors. Competitors such as China can now position themselves as more consistent anti‑corruption partners, while allies like the UK, France, and Switzerland launch new prosecutorial task forces to fill the void. The cumulative effect threatens U.S. standing at the Financial Action Task Force and may reshape global bribery risk calculations for years to come.