Ad Law Reading Room: “Protecting Perkins: Removal, Supervision, and Article II,” By Amy Wildermuth and Peyton Baker

Key Takeaways

• Perkins permits Congress to limit removal of inferior officers appointed by department heads
• Seila Law’s “limited duties” test contradicts historical Perkins doctrine
• Supervision and final decision‑making authority define true inferior status
• Scholars foresee renewed congressional action to protect lower‑level officials

Pulse Analysis

The 1886 *United States v. Perkins* case has long been a quiet cornerstone of administrative law, establishing that Congress may impose removal restrictions on inferior officers whose appointments rest with a department head. By reconstructing the case’s factual and legal backdrop, Wildermuth and Baker illuminate how the Court’s original reasoning hinged on the balance between executive control and legislative oversight. This historical lens clarifies why Perkins remains relevant, even as the modern judiciary reshapes the removal‑protection landscape.

Recent Supreme Court decisions, especially *Seila Law* (2020), have narrowed the scope of permissible removal protections, arguing that only inferior officers with “limited duties” may enjoy such safeguards. The authors argue that this reading distorts Perkins, which focused not on duties but on the hierarchical relationship—specifically, whether an officer remains subject to supervision and lacks final decision‑making power. By juxtaposing Perkins with later cases like *Myers*, *Humphrey’s Executor*, and *Morrison v. Olson*, the article demonstrates a consistent doctrinal thread that the Court has now abandoned, raising concerns about the durability of congressional authority.

The scholarship’s implications extend beyond academic debate. If courts continue to erode removal‑protection doctrines, Congress may be compelled to craft new statutory frameworks that emphasize clear supervisory structures, ensuring that lower‑level officials remain “inferior” under Article II. This could reshape the federal bureaucracy, granting agencies greater stability while preserving presidential oversight. Practitioners, policymakers, and scholars should monitor how the supervision‑based test proposed by Wildermuth and Baker influences future litigation and legislative drafting, as it offers a viable pathway to reconcile executive authority with enduring congressional safeguards.