The case tests the balance between state‑mandated academic diversity and constitutional free‑speech protections, potentially setting precedent for campus‑free‑speech litigation across the United States.
The Indiana "intellectual diversity" statute, enacted in 2022, reflects a growing trend among state legislatures to codify ideological balance in higher education. Proponents argue that exposing students to a spectrum of political viewpoints prepares them for democratic participation and counters perceived echo chambers. Critics, however, contend that mandating curricular content intrudes on academic autonomy and may compel educators to present perspectives that conflict with scholarly consensus, raising constitutional concerns about government overreach in the classroom.
Legal challenges to the law hinge on First Amendment jurisprudence and procedural doctrines such as standing and ripeness. The professors allege that the statute forces them to alter course material, effectively compelling speech and chilling scholarly inquiry. The district court dismissed the suit, finding the plaintiffs lacked a concrete injury because the law had not yet been enforced against them. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit is scrutinizing whether speculative harms satisfy the injury‑in‑fact requirement, a question that could redefine how courts assess pre‑enforcement challenges in academic settings. The panel’s deliberations also touch on the judiciary’s role in providing guidance versus waiting for actual enforcement actions.
The broader implications extend beyond Indiana’s campuses. A ruling affirming the professors’ standing could embolden faculty nationwide to contest similar statutes, potentially curbing state attempts to regulate curricula. Conversely, a decision upholding the lower court’s dismissal may signal judicial deference to legislative experiments in educational policy, leaving academic freedom protections to evolve through legislative or institutional channels. Stakeholders—from university administrators to civil‑rights groups—are watching closely, as the outcome may shape the legal landscape for intellectual diversity mandates across the United States.
CHICAGO (CN) — Several Indiana professors tried to convince a perplexed Seventh Circuit panel Thursday morning that an update to the state’s higher education law violates their First Amendment rights.
The underlying law, enacted in 2022, forces all of Indiana’s public higher educational institutions “to foster a culture of free inquiry, free expression and intellectual diversity within the institution” and to “expose students to scholarly works from a variety of political or ideological frameworks.” Professors who don’t comply with the new requirements risk losing their tenure, or in some cases, termination.
Four professors, two from Indiana University and two from Purdue University, maintained that they’ve been required to significantly alter their curricula to comply with the law’s demands. They argue this violates their First Amendment right to free speech.
Stevie Pactor, an attorney for the professors, provided the three-judge panel with an example of a professor who teaches in Holocaust and genocide studies, noting how he is concerned that he’ll now have to teach his students Holocaust revisionism.
A lower court agreed the Indiana law chilled the professors’ protected speech, but it ultimately ruled against them. The court determined the professors lacked adequate standing to bring the case forward because the law governs trustees of the universities. It also determined that the case wasn’t ripe — or brought before the court at an appropriate time — because the law hasn’t been fully enforced at Indiana’s public universities.
John Lowrey, an attorney on behalf of the state of Indiana, pushed the panel to affirm the lower court’s decision, particularly because the professors don’t have an injury in fact that is traceable to the law.
“As we heard from counsel on the other side, has the well-founded fear occurred, now that the policy is being enforced?” U.S. Circuit Judge Doris Pryor, a Joe Biden appointee, asked Lowrey.
“It has not, your honor, because of two reasons. First of all, we don’t have any actual details of that enforcement against a different professor, and second because plaintiffs don’t need standing a year after the filing of their case, they need standing at the time they file their case,” Lowrey responded.
Pactor, from the ACLU of Indiana, claimed the new requirement puts professors between a rock and a hard place.
“At the end of the day, the question we’re left with is what are the professors to do?” she said. “They have two choices: They can engage in the speech that they believe offends the policies in the act, they can refuse to engage in the compelled speech that they think it requires of them or they can make the changes that they’re making right now.”
“But this court’s case law makes clear that they need not subject themselves to enforcement or discipline before they have standing to be able to challenge these claims,” Pactor continued.
“I’m not sure there isn’t another option there, of waiting,” U.S. Circuit Judge Joshua Kolar interrupted.
“Which of course this court could have done in Brown v. Kemp — it didn’t,” the Joe Biden appointee continued, citing a Seventh Circuit decision from 2023 that addressed the constitutionality of a Wisconsin hunting law. “They could’ve said, look, police officers are the people on the ground who are the ones enforcing this. Let’s wait and see what their policies are to see what is viewed as offending and what is not.”
“But that gives no guidance whatsoever to the people on the ground who are actually having their First Amendment rights curtailed,” Pactor responded.
“Do you think the job of the court is to give guidance, as if judges were attorneys, rather than resolve concrete disputes?” U.S. Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook, a Ronald Reagan appointee, asked.
“I would never say that,” she answered.
“If you want guidance, you hire an attorney,” he continued.
“I would never say that to you of all people, Judge Easterbrook,” Pactor said. “So no, that is absolutely not the role of a court, but the role of a court is to adjudicate a person’s First Amendment rights when they’re being violated, and that’s what we have.”
Easterbrook responded with a chuckle, and the panel took the case under advisement without indicating when it might rule on the matter.
Comments
Want to join the conversation?
Loading comments...