Minerals at War: Strategic Resources and the Foundations of the U.S. Defense Industrial Base – by Gracelin Baskaran and Samantha Dady (Centre for Strategic & International Studies – January 14, 2026)

Key Takeaways

• WWI powers sourced minerals via colonial empires
• Post‑Cold War drawdown crippled U.S. mineral processing
• Stockpiles alone cannot replace domestic industrial capacity
• Continuous stewardship needed for national‑security resilience

Summary

The CSIS paper traces the United States’ century‑long pattern of mobilizing massive state resources—stockpiles, price controls, financing, and foreign procurement—to secure critical minerals during wartime, then dismantling those mechanisms in peacetime. Post‑Cold War drawdowns hollowed out domestic mining, processing, and expertise, leaving the defense industrial base dependent on foreign, often adversarial, supply chains. Historical analysis shows that reliance on stockpiles without industrial capacity and neglect of refining have repeatedly undermined security. The authors argue that mineral security must become a permanent, integrated policy, not an episodic crisis response.

Pulse Analysis

The United States’ historical reliance on emergency measures to secure critical minerals reflects a broader pattern of reactive industrial policy. During World Wars and the Korean conflict, the government built extensive stockpiles, imposed price controls, and financed overseas extraction to keep the war machine running. Yet each post‑conflict era saw a rapid rollback of these programs, leaving the nation with depleted reserves and a thin domestic processing base. This cyclical approach created a structural blind spot: the nation could win battles but struggled to sustain long‑term strategic autonomy.

In the post‑Cold War era, defense budget reductions and a belief in market self‑correction accelerated the erosion of U.S. mineral capabilities. Mining projects stalled, refining capacity dwindled, and expertise migrated abroad, making the defense industrial base increasingly dependent on imports from countries that are now strategic competitors. The resulting supply chain fragility is evident in recent shortages of rare earths, lithium, and other essential elements needed for advanced weapons, hypersonic systems, and autonomous platforms. As allies like the European Union and Japan launch their own mineral security initiatives, the United States faces a competitive disadvantage that could translate into reduced operational readiness.

The CSIS authors propose a shift from episodic crisis management to a permanent, integrated industrial strategy. This would involve sustained investment in domestic mining and processing, public‑private partnerships to develop next‑generation extraction technologies, and coordinated ally engagement to diversify supply sources. Embedding mineral security into the broader national‑security framework ensures that the defense industrial base remains resilient against future shocks, whether from geopolitical tensions or rapid technological change. Such a proactive stance aligns with the United States’ strategic imperative to maintain technological superiority and protect critical infrastructure.