Jimmy Dempsey's Frontier Airlines
•February 15, 2026
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Why It Matters
Understanding Frontier’s strategic pivot is crucial for investors, airport planners, and industry watchers as it signals how low‑cost carriers may compete with legacy airlines on frequency and cost efficiency. The episode highlights broader trends—fleet optimization, product differentiation, and potential consolidation—that will shape the future of U.S. air travel and impact regional airport development.
Jimmy Dempsey's Frontier Airlines
It’s Sunday morning, February 15, 2026, and I just happened to be sitting at my desk - and not planning to write until later - when Mike Boyd’s weekly Touch and Go column appeared in my mailbox [Boyd Touch & Go]. To know Mike, a spade is a spade. Boyd often targets airports and the practice of Air Service Development in his writings. He begins:
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For Small & Mid-Size Airports, It’s No Longer an ASD Option.
Summary: Frontier Airlines’ new management has declared Code Red and is taking steps to turn the carrier around. The question is whether F9 has the fleet and the market presence to pull it off. As an ASD target, only high density-potential airports need apply.
Jimmy Dempsey, Frontier’s newly anointed CEO made a short statement to begin Frontier’s quarterly call with Wall Street analysts to discuss their performance in the 4th quarter of 2025 and forward-looking statements for 2026. I loved the fact that the formal remarks were short and to the point. Dempsey’s message:
… laser focused on returning Frontier to profitability, strengthening our competitive position and driving enhanced value for our stakeholders.
To achieve this, we’re executing a strategy centered on four key priorities: rightsizing our fleet, strengthening our cost discipline, reducing cancellations and improving on-time performance, and maturing customer loyalty.”
The takeaways from analysts in New York and others:
Cranky Flier: Frontier Goes Back to the Future: Higher Frequency and a Lot of Florida and Las Vegas
Christopher Stathoulopoulos at Susquehanna: Transitioning Back to Utilization
Mike Linenberg at Deutsche Bank: Fleet Actions Target Structural Cost Savings
Andrew Didora at Bank of America: We See Higher Capacity as a Risk
Jamie Baker at JP Morgan: Fleet Overhaul an Important Pivot, but Not a Panacea
Yep. Yep. Yep. Yep. Yep. and Yep.
On December 18, 2025, I did an interview with Christine Boynton at Aviation Week as there was renewed speculation regarding a Frontier and Spirit combination. My thoughts as expressed to Christine:
I find myself wondering if the Spirit creditors—aircraft lessors—might be willing to exchange certain Frontier aircraft orders and more in return for a stake in a merged entity … This could be something attractive—a needed smaller Frontier—particularly its order book and a demonstrably smaller Spirit,” based on Frontier’s fleet in numbers as not that much different than where Spirit was in late 2024.
For the past who knows how many quarters, Frontier takes delivery of aircraft all the while the overall utilization of their fleet becomes less. For a self-proclaimed low-cost airline, that math is bad math. Taking aircraft for the sake of realizing nearly $1 billion sale-leaseback proceeds since 2019 is bad math because at some point the airline has to pay for the liquidity generated from this financial engineering.
For me, smaller was just an inevitability - but also necessary. Bernie Madoff demonstrated that Ponzi Schemes make for a successful veneer until they don’t. For me, this has been Frontier’s flight path for some time.
THIS MORNING’S THOUGHTS
It is hard to disagree with any of the takeaways listed above. Nothing was mentioned about seat reductions and that eliminates most small and even mid-sized market areas. Ending 2026 with the same number of aircraft that the year began with yet producing 10% growth points to one benefit of increased utilization - doing more with less. This will result in structural cost savings - but then the question of growing 10% in 2026 is more than fair. Only Breeze will grow at a faster rate. So, a focus on the fleet is an important pivot for a company that has been drunk on airplane deliveries but will not result in some panacea of outcomes in the immediate term.
All of the above taken with a schedule focused on yesterday’s Pandemic induced panacea of Las Vegas, Florida and operating in large airport pairs is also a pivot of sorts. Back to the future as Cranky writes.
THE ULTIMATE TEST OF BASIC ECONOMY v. INCREASED FREQUENCY
I am so over those pointing at Basic Economy as the devil. Why is it the devil when it is a competitive weapon to thwart low-cost airline incursions into your network? The Value Airline sector for some has been enabled most by traffic spilled by network airlines. Basic Economy is a tool employed by network airlines to appeal to the very traffic base they were willing to spill and feed a sector wanting to capitalize on the inability of the higher cost producer to price match.
That just sounds smart to me. You know, that adapt or die thing?
Basic Economy was always going to be a winner in that the network carriers operate multiple frequencies per day between numerous large airport pairs. And also have the ability to reaccommodate displaced demand the same day and not make one wait for 3 days.
Let’s assume that Basic Economy is 40 seats per departure that is available on 3-5 network carrier flights per day. The Value Airlines like Spirit and Frontier would offer 200 seats per departure 2 days per week.
So, if the network airlines offer 40 seats per departure 4 times per day for 30 days v. 2 departures per week with 200 seats per departure - who is going to win? Or stated another way: The network carriers would offer 40 seats X 4 times per day X 6.5 days per week = 1,040 seats per week. Spirit or Frontier operate 200 seats per departure 2 times per week = 400 seats. 400 seats v. 1,040 seats is one half of the equation. The other half is 640 seats are offered nearly every day and are not limited to Tuesdays and Fridays for example.
Once again, it is just math.
Dempsey’s Frontier it seems will begin to offer multiple daily frequencies with big narrowbodies v. network airlines offering more frequencies with much less seat exposure per departure to the lower fare segment.
It is critical to always be reminded that the process of de-commoditization requires companies to determine the customers they DO NOT want to target.
THE NEW MATH
Best I can see, Dempsey’s Frontier will offer 400 seats per day to compete with the network airlines offering 160 Basic Economy seats per day or so. That math suggests that Frontier will win based on seat share between airport pairs only. It is true that the new Frontier will have other seating products available too. But what they do not have available is the entirety of air travel consumer product that Delta and United have to offer.
Therefore, in my mind, relying on seat share calculation as accepted in a world of ubiquitous airline product math will overstate the Value Airline sector potential. The network airlines are now tiering the tiers of product offered while Southwest and the Value Airline sector are just beginning to offer what Delta, United, and Alaska have offered all along.
Yet again, this is not market strategy that needs to be considered let alone be adopted by Allegiant and Sun Country as they are different than others inside of what we loosely reference as the Value Airline sector. For Frontier and Spirit, this will be the ultimate examination into what they view to be a Value Airline inside of the U.S. airline industry.
SKIRMISHES, BATTLES, AND WARS
I am not sure what level of combat this Basic Economy v. Value Airline product might be. But it sure as hell is greater than zero. It will be nothing but a skirmish between some airport pairs. It will be a battle for certain geography and in case you haven’t noticed, the network airlines have added capacity in Florida and Las Vegas as the Value Airline sector reduced.
Mostly it will be a strategy in fighting the war for market relevance in the U.S. domestic space. Just like battles to win the largest metro areas like Chicago and Los Angeles and others. The initial take on 2026 is that it will be better based on the simple relationship of seat supply to demand that will drive higher revenue generation for all.
What we haven’t talked about in a very long time is how airlines might weaponize that capacity relationship to win relevance. This is the war that still has many battles playing out in multiple theatres around the U.S. This Frontier strategy is a fight they must undertake as they have a fleet that can only operate between large airport pairs.
CAPX spending typically refers to investments in aircraft and non-aircraft assets. I am thinking we might need to add a third category to CAPX - DEFENSE SPENDING.
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