Transatlantic Cooperation on AI and National Security

Why It Matters

Without a stable EU‑U.S. AI framework, Europe may drift toward independent supply chains, weakening collective security and economic competitiveness, while the United States loses a reliable partner to enforce its export‑control objectives.

Key Takeaways

• US AI export controls strain EU innovation and digital sovereignty
• Policy unpredictability hampers coordinated transatlantic AI security strategy
• Divergent EU stances on China block unified export‑control approach
• Legacy chip market offers pragmatic EU‑US cooperation opportunity
• Formal AI dialogue mechanisms remain dormant, risking ad‑hoc bargaining

Pulse Analysis

The United States has used AI export controls as a lever of national‑security, industrial‑policy, and commercial‑diplomacy since the early 2020s. Successive administrations—from Biden’s “AI diffusion rule” to Trump’s “Pax Silica” initiative—have alternated between tightening and loosening restrictions on high‑end AI chips, often without a clear, consistent dialogue with European partners. This volatility has forced EU firms to navigate a patchwork of licensing regimes, raising compliance costs and prompting calls for greater digital sovereignty.

Europe’s response is shaped by a fragmented view of China and a desire to protect its own high‑tech ecosystem, anchored by ASML, IMEC and emerging AI research hubs. While the EU’s AI Continent Action Plan and the forthcoming “Chips Act 2.0” aim to capture a larger share of global semiconductor production, the lack of a joint transatlantic strategy risks turning cooperation into a “managed interdependence” where the United States retains asymmetric leverage. The resulting uncertainty hampers joint standards work, downstream monitoring, and coordinated sanctions, eroding the strategic advantage that a unified front could provide against adversarial AI misuse.

Pragmatic pathways remain, notably in the legacy chip sector where U.S. and European interests still align to curb Chinese market dominance. Re‑energizing formal mechanisms such as the Trade and Technology Council, establishing an informal EU‑U.S. AI export‑control working group, and launching joint scenario‑planning exercises could restore predictability. By coupling these diplomatic tools with concrete industry collaborations on older semiconductor technologies, both sides can safeguard supply‑chain resilience, reinforce shared security goals, and lay the groundwork for a more comprehensive AI partnership in the years ahead.