BONUS In Brief: Vibes Out of Munich

Why It Matters

Understanding these shifts is crucial for policymakers and businesses that operate across the Atlantic, as changing alliances will reshape security, trade, and regulatory frameworks. The episode is timely because the Munich conference sets the agenda for Europe’s next decade of defence and diplomatic strategy.

BONUS In Brief: Vibes Out of Munich

When the world's at stake, go beyond the headlines.

Authors: Gesine Weber, Ulrike Franke, Matthew Savill, and Monika Sus

Date: February 19, 2026

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On Feb. 13‑15, leaders and specialists from around the world — especially Europe and the United States — attended the 62nd Munich Security Conference. This year’s conference highlighted an ongoing European interest in maintaining the trans‑Atlantic relationship, an emphasis on European “derisking” from reliance on the United States, and a general agreement — tinged with grief or celebration, depending on who you ask — that the post‑World War II liberal, rules‑based world order is gone.

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s speech was reassuring to some attendees, as it emphasized that the United States and Europe “belong together,” but it worried others with its implicit criticisms of modern‑day Europe and the mechanisms and norms of the post‑World War II international system.

We asked four experts to assess the general sentiments of attendees from France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Poland, as they process their takeaways from the conference.

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Gesine Weber, Senior Researcher, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich (France)

For France, there are two main takeaways from the Munich Security Conference.

1. European strategic autonomy is a strategic necessity. The event confirmed that European strategic autonomy is not a random choice but a strategic necessity — a view that French officials, especially President Emmanuel Macron, have stressed since 2017.

2. Growing rifts between France and Germany on European defence. Chancellor Friedrich Merz and German ministers, despite increasingly open criticism of Washington, still emphasize the importance of the trans‑Atlantic bond and are more hesitant about going all‑in on European defence made in Europe.

These observations reflect French assumptions about the foreign‑policy trajectory of the United States and Washington’s unpredictability as a partner.