Batteries as a New Theatre of Geopolitical Rivalry

Why It Matters

Battery supply disruption would threaten critical infrastructure and defence across Europe, exposing a strategic vulnerability to geopolitical pressure.

Key Takeaways

• EU imports 85‑87% of batteries from China.
• Battery shortage would cripple Poland’s energy, logistics, defence.
• China could halt exports, creating a strategic vulnerability.
• Europe needs domestic battery production and raw material diversification.
• Military operations increasingly rely on high‑density battery power.

Pulse Analysis

China’s dominance in lithium‑ion cell production has turned batteries into a geopolitical flashpoint. While Europe pours billions into renewable energy and electric mobility, more than four‑fifths of the batteries powering these initiatives arrive from Chinese factories. This structural reliance compresses supply chains, inflates prices, and leaves the continent vulnerable to policy shifts or export bans from Beijing, a risk that traditional energy sectors have largely avoided.

For Poland and its neighbour Ukraine, the stakes are even higher. Polish logistics hubs, electric‑vehicle fleets, and industrial plants depend on steady battery deliveries to sustain growth and maintain competitiveness. In Ukraine, batteries power drones, medical equipment, and command‑and‑control systems that have become essential in the ongoing conflict. A sudden halt in Chinese exports would curtail drone operations, strain hospital power supplies, and force both nations to ration critical equipment, eroding both economic resilience and defensive capabilities.

Policymakers therefore must treat batteries as strategic assets. The EU should accelerate investments in domestic cell manufacturing, secure raw‑material sources through diversified mining partnerships, and create strategic reserves of critical components. Aligning defence planning with energy‑storage initiatives—such as integrating battery stockpiles into NATO logistics—will reduce the leverage of external suppliers and ensure that Europe’s energy transition and security posture remain robust against future geopolitical shocks.

Batteries as a new theatre of geopolitical rivalry

28 January 2026, 07:40 · 10 min read

We most often think of the energy sector in the context of massive investments, such as the announced funds that the European Union has decided to allocate for the construction of nuclear power plants in Poland. Meanwhile, we are overlooking something much more obvious, something that has always been present and has never really posed a problem in terms of availability: batteries.

Photo. Envato / @tongpatong

This is an inconspicuous yet absolutely essential source of energy in everyday life. Without batteries and accumulators, a car won’t start, a cell phone won’t work, and no modern device today can function. Without photovoltaic farms and energy‑storage batteries, there may soon be no stable electricity supply. This year, for the first time in history, more than half of newly installed electricity‑generation capacity comes from solar energy, and its purpose and future are inextricably linked to the development of battery technologies.

Batteries and the Military

Batteries are crucial in all domains of military operations today. On land, they power vehicles, various portable devices, micro‑grids, and energy weapons; at sea, they power ships, torpedoes, and autonomous underwater vehicles. In the air, they are found in missiles, drones, and fighter jets. In space, in conjunction with solar panels, they enable the operation of satellites responsible for reconnaissance, positioning, and communications. Even in cyberspace, they play a crucial role, providing emergency power to COMSEC systems, data centres, and supercomputers.

However, there is no single universal battery for all applications. They differ in chemical composition and parameters such as energy and power density, durability, and safety. Batteries used in missiles differ significantly from those used in fighter jets, and heavy energy‑storage systems for micro‑grids are not suitable for lightweight portable devices. Furthermore, military batteries must operate reliably under conditions of extreme temperatures, shock, and vibration, while maintaining consistent performance.

Chinese dominance – A dangerous dependence

In 2024‑2025, the picture for the European battery and accumulator market remains clear. Interesting information on this topic has been presented in a number of publications, including L. Trakimavičius, “Wanted: More Batteries for Defence,” RUSI, October 2025; “China’s Lithium‑Ion Battery Exports Surge 47 % to 78 GWh,” Battery Tech Network, November 2025; and G. Maguire, “BESS Boom – China’s Battery Exports Charge to New Highs,” Reuters, November 2025. The European Union is highly dependent on supplies from China. Eurostat data and their updates used in 2024 analyses show that approximately 85‑87 % of all batteries and accumulators imported into the EU originate from China.

This means that the vast majority of batteries used in European electric vehicles, renewable‑energy installations, and industrial systems rely on Chinese supply chains. This dependence is structural, not temporary. In 2024‑2025, China will maintain a dominant position not only in finished battery exports to Europe but also in global cell production, with its share estimated at over 80 %, while Europe accounts for only a few percent of global production. Even though some final assembly takes place in the EU, key components and technologies still come from Asia. In practice, Europe imports not only the product but also the risks associated with geopolitical tensions, trade policies, and the possibility of sudden supply disruptions.

Available data indicate Europe’s strong dependence on China. As a result, the energy transition, electromobility, and the development of energy‑storage facilities in the EU are dependent on supplies from a single geographical location, increasing the risk of supply‑chain disruptions and threats to transportation, the energy sector, and the resilience of critical infrastructure.

Strategic risk for Poland

A suspension of battery exports by China would have similar consequences for Poland as for the rest of Europe, but in several areas Poland could be even more vulnerable. This stems from the nature of the Polish economy, the structure of the energy sector, the role of logistics, and its proximity to Ukraine. What would such a crisis look like from a Polish perspective?

• Energy – The system is already unstable and overloaded, and the development of renewable‑energy sources, especially photovoltaics, depends on energy‑storage facilities. A lack of battery supplies would halt these investments, increasing the risk of failure and the need to import energy and power reserves from abroad.

• Transport and logistics – Poland is a leader in European transport. Hundreds of thousands of electric devices, from forklifts to autonomous systems, are used in ports, container terminals, logistics centres, and warehouses. A battery shortage would limit fleet modernisation and infrastructure maintenance, reduce efficiency, increase costs, and slow down supply chains, impacting exports, trade, and GDP.

• Industrial production – Industries such as household appliances, electronics, and automotive rely on batteries; a shortage or rising prices would limit production, exports, and investment, and in the long term, employment, especially in major industrial centres.

• Social level – The battery crisis would mean rising living costs, more expensive electronics, medical equipment, and transportation. Problems with device servicing would affect hospitals and public transport, compromising the quality of public services.

• Geopolitical consequences – Dependence on supplies from outside China would increase, while competition with other EU countries for limited resources would rise, risking tensions within the EU. Poland, as a highly industrialised country dependent on imported components, would be among the hardest hit.

• Military vulnerability – The modernisation of the Polish armed forces relies on technologies that largely require advanced batteries, from reconnaissance and strike drones to communication systems, sensors, support vehicles, and optoelectronics. As a country bordering Ukraine and a key support hub for the Ukrainian war effort, Poland would feel additional pressure. A battery shortage would hamper both its own defence investments and the supply of equipment to Kyiv. At some point, Poland could be forced to ration equipment, delay purchases, or hastily seek alternative suppliers, increasing costs and extending delivery times.

In short, a suspension of China’s battery exports to Poland would simultaneously impact the energy sector, logistics, industry, the daily lives of citizens, and military security. The effects would be spread over time, but their scale—from delayed energy transition to export disruptions to defence problems—would make it a crisis felt in almost every sphere of the country’s functioning.

A front without drones?

How would a shortage of Chinese batteries impact Ukraine? The consequences of an export suspension would be much more severe here than for EU countries. A battery shortage would disrupt hospitals (many medical devices require electricity under unstable power conditions), command posts, shelters, emergency centres, and critical infrastructure. Consequently, any Russian attack on thermal power plants or transformer stations would have a more severe impact on the civilian population.

The Ukrainian economy would also face serious difficulties, potentially forcing Ukraine to compete with EU countries for the same limited resources and compelling allies to make difficult choices. In the broader perspective, a battery shortage would weaken Ukraine’s resilience, both military and civilian.

The ability to maintain critical infrastructure, protect the population, maintain state continuity in wartime, and conduct combat operations would be diminished. Defence would be the most affected sector. The Ukrainian military relies heavily on drones, both for reconnaissance and attack. The war in Ukraine is already being called the world’s first “drone war.” It could also become the world’s first artificial‑intelligence war, but also a battery war. Batteries for various military devices are one of the main consumables; they “wear out” quickly (they simply melt into the attacked targets) or require frequent replacement, and their quality directly affects range, flight time, and mission effectiveness. Most of these batteries come directly from China or from components of Chinese origin.

A suspension of deliveries would mean an immediate reduction in the number of active systems on the frontline. Ukraine would be forced to curtail drone operations, which are currently one of its key tools for building an asymmetric advantage over Russia. The ability to conduct reconnaissance, precision strikes, and destroy targets deep within Russian lines would be diminished, giving Russia greater operational freedom.

Problems would also arise in other defence segments, such as tactical communications, optical equipment, artillery systems, mine‑laying devices, engineering robots, and surveillance systems. All of these rely on high‑energy‑density batteries. A supply shortage would lead to failures, operational limitations, and a decrease in efficiency. In some sections of the front, this could even lead to a loss of situational awareness, making units more vulnerable to Russian attacks.

How to build a battery shield?

The battery problem may seem trivial at first glance, but its impact on defence could be enormous. Suspending the export of batteries and accumulators by China would be a blow not only to the European economy (including Poland) but also to the defence capabilities of the entire continent. They are a silent yet crucial component of modern warfare—from batteries in Ukrainian drones, through NATO communications systems, to the energy base of the defence industry. A single political decision by Beijing could cause Europe, dependent on Chinese supplies, to wake up to a world where the front lines will lack… energy.

Recommendations for Europe should focus on mitigating the risks arising from excessive dependence on a single source of battery supplies. Therefore, the EU should systematically shift its focus from imports to developing its own capabilities throughout the entire value chain, from raw‑material processing to the production and scaling of battery technologies. Data from recent years show that batteries have become a key element of strategic security. Without this change, Europe will remain vulnerable to disruptions and dependent on the decisions of external suppliers.

• The EU should diversify its supply of critical raw materials, reducing dependence on individual countries and unstable regions. This requires investing in extraction abroad, developing its own capabilities where possible, and relocating processing to Europe to mitigate geopolitical risks associated with supply disruptions.

• Europe should support the development and commercialisation of its own battery technologies, which would reduce risk and shorten supply chains. This may be a more expensive solution, but it is certainly safer.

• Batteries and energy storage should be treated as an element of strategic security. Reserves of key components should be created, and battery technologies incorporated into defence planning—including NATO and the EU—to increase infrastructure resilience, troop mobility, and strategic autonomy in the face of crises and geopolitical threats.

It may seem odd, but in modern warfare both an artillery battery and an AA battery can determine the outcome of a battle. Without the latter, the former often doesn’t even know where to fire. It turns out that a simple battery bought in a store and an artillery battery often play in the same league. One powers sensors and drones, the other attacks whatever the previous one detects.

Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Andrzej Fałkowski, Ph.D. – former Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces (DChoD) and Director of the Logistics and Resources Division of the NATO International Military Staff (IMS) in Brussels.