US Removing Guardrails From Proposed Saudi Nuclear Deal, Document Says

Why It Matters

The agreement could accelerate Saudi nuclear capabilities without robust oversight, heightening proliferation risks and reshaping Middle‑East power dynamics. Congressional action will determine whether U.S. policy prioritises commercial interests over non‑proliferation norms.

Key Takeaways

• Trump proposes 123 Agreement without Additional Protocol
• Deal could permit Saudi uranium enrichment and reprocessing
• Congress has 90 days to block agreement
• Saudi Crown Prince threatens nuclear weapons if Iran arms
• Arms‑control groups warn of proliferation precedent

Pulse Analysis

The United States and Saudi Arabia have long floated a civilian nuclear collaboration, typically framed by the 123 Agreement that obliges the partner nation to forgo enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. By stripping the Additional Protocol—a treaty‑level safeguard that grants the IAEA extensive inspection rights—the Trump administration is signaling a shift toward commercial expediency. This move aligns with broader U.S. strategic aims to secure market share for American nuclear firms, yet it diverges sharply from the non‑proliferation standards upheld by successive administrations.

Proliferation experts warn that permitting Saudi enrichment and reprocessing could lower the technical barrier to a weapons program, especially given Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s public statements about matching Iran’s nuclear posture. The absence of stringent verification mechanisms may also embolden other regional actors to pursue similar pathways, potentially igniting a new arms race in the Middle East. Within Washington, bipartisan concern is mounting, as lawmakers cite the precedent such a deal would set for future U.S. nuclear cooperation worldwide.

Congress now faces a decisive 90‑day window to either endorse or block the agreement. A rejection would reaffirm the United States’ commitment to the global non‑proliferation regime and preserve the integrity of the Additional Protocol framework. Conversely, approval could unlock lucrative contracts for U.S. nuclear vendors while reshaping geopolitical calculations in a region already fraught with tension. The outcome will signal whether commercial interests can outweigh longstanding security safeguards in America’s foreign‑policy calculus.

US removing guardrails from proposed Saudi nuclear deal, document says

By Timothy Gardner and Jonathan Landay · Washington, Feb 19 (Reuters)

President Donald Trump has told Congress he is pursuing a civil nuclear pact with Saudi Arabia that does not include non‑proliferation safeguards the U.S. has long said would ensure the kingdom does not develop nuclear weapons, according to a copy of the document sent to Congress and reviewed by Reuters.

Trump, a Republican, and former President Joe Biden, a Democrat, have worked with Saudi Arabia on paths to building the first civil nuclear power plants for the kingdom.

The development comes amid fears of a new global nuclear arms race following the expiration earlier this month of the last strategic arms limitation treaty between Russia and the United States, and China’s moves to expand its own nuclear arsenal.

Arms‑control groups and many Democrats and some leading Republicans—including Secretary of State Marco Rubio when he served in the Senate—have insisted that any agreement come with guardrails, including that Saudi Arabia not have the ability to enrich uranium or to reprocess spent nuclear fuel, potential pathways to weapons, demands also made by successive U.S. administrations.

They also insist that Saudi Arabia agree to the so‑called Additional Protocol that grants the U.N.’s International Atomic Energy Agency broad and more intrusive oversight of a country’s nuclear activities, such as the power to carry out snap inspections at undeclared locations.

The Trump administration sent an initial report to leaders on some congressional committees in November, a copy of which was seen by Reuters, that it is required to send if it is not pursuing the Additional Protocol, the Arms Control Association, an advocacy group, said on Thursday.

The report “raises concerns that the Trump administration has not carefully considered the proliferation risks posed by its proposed nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia or the precedent this agreement may set,” Kelsey Davenport, the head of nonproliferation policy for ACA, said in an article published on Thursday.

Trump’s report to Congress says that the draft U.S.–Saudi pact on civil nuclear, known as a 123 Agreement, puts the U.S. industry at the heart of Saudi Arabia’s civil nuclear development, ensuring nuclear‑proliferation safeguards are in place.

The document, however, opens the way to Saudi Arabia also having an enrichment program as it refers to “additional safeguards and verification measures to the most sensitive areas of potential nuclear cooperation” between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, including enrichment and reprocessing.

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, has said that the kingdom would seek to develop nuclear weapons if regional rival Iran did so.

“If they get one, we have to get one,” the crown prince told Fox News in 2023, saying a weapon would be necessary “for security reasons, and for balancing power in the Middle East, but we don’t want to see that.”

The White House and the State Department did not immediately respond to requests for comment. Saudi Arabia’s embassy in Washington did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Congressional check

Davenport said “It behooves Congress” to provide a check on the administration’s power to strike an agreement with the kingdom and “consider not just the implications for Saudi Arabia, but also the precedent that this deal will set, and vigorously examine the terms of the proposed 123 Agreement.”

The Trump administration could submit the 123 Agreement to Congress as soon as February 22, ACA said, as it has about 90 days after the report to Congress to send it. Unless both the Senate and the U.S. House pass resolutions opposing the 123 Agreement within 90 days, it would go into effect and allow Saudi Arabia a civil nuclear program.

(Reporting by Timothy Gardner and Jonathan Landay; Editing by Don Durfee and Diane Craft)