China Should Stop Hoarding Food and Fertiliser, Says Former World Bank Chief

Why It Matters

China’s export curbs risk depressing global crop yields and pushing food prices higher, especially for vulnerable economies. The dispute also highlights how geopolitical tensions can reshape critical supply chains and trade rules.

Key Takeaways

• China holds largest global food and fertilizer stockpiles, limiting exports
• Fertilizer export halt could cut up to 10 billion meals weekly worldwide
• China made ~25% of global fertilizer, earning $13 bn in exports
• Malpass challenges China's developing‑country label, citing its economic size

Pulse Analysis

The current fertilizer shortage stems largely from the disruption of oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint that carries a significant share of the world’s nitrogen‑based inputs. When Iranian tensions flare, shipping delays ripple through the supply chain, inflating prices for ammonium nitrate and urea—key ingredients for modern agriculture. Analysts warn that a sustained shortfall could shave yields across major grain belts, translating into higher consumer food costs and heightened volatility in commodity markets.

China’s role amplifies the pressure. As the second‑largest economy, it produces roughly a quarter of the world’s fertilizer and previously exported more than $13 bn worth of products. Since early 2021, Beijing has incrementally imposed export restrictions, culminating in a full halt on several fertilizer types this spring. The policy aims to safeguard domestic food security but inadvertently tightens global supplies, prompting warnings from industry leaders like Yara’s CEO that up to 10 billion meals a week could be at risk. The stockpiling strategy also signals a broader trend of strategic reserves that can be leveraged in trade negotiations.

Beyond commodities, the episode underscores a shifting geopolitical landscape. Malpass’s criticism of China’s developing‑country status reflects growing frustration in Washington over perceived trade imbalances and policy opacity. Meanwhile, Chinese officials maintain that external shocks—not Chinese policy—drive the crisis, defending their WTO classification. As the Trump‑Xi summit approaches, both sides have incentives to cooperate on keeping maritime routes open, yet divergent narratives on responsibility could complicate consensus. The outcome will shape not only fertilizer markets but also broader discussions on supply‑chain resilience and the rules governing emerging economic powers.