Lithuania Could Break EU Ranks Over Critical Minerals Deal

Why It Matters

Lithuania’s possible defection underscores growing friction between national security needs and EU consensus, reshaping the geopolitical landscape of critical mineral sourcing.

Key Takeaways

• Lithuania may sign independent US minerals pact
• EU delays could trigger Eastern European defections
• Goal: secure rare earths, battery metals, avoid China
• US encourages bilateral deals to counter Chinese refining
• Potential domino effect on NATO states' supply chains

Pulse Analysis

The race for critical minerals has become a defining front in the broader strategic competition with China. While the European Union has been working toward a unified framework to secure supply chains, its consensus‑driven process often stalls, leaving frontline NATO members like Lithuania vulnerable. By eyeing a direct partnership with Washington, Vilnius seeks to lock in reliable access to rare‑earth magnets, battery metals, gallium and germanium—materials essential for modern defense systems and high‑tech manufacturing. This approach reflects a growing impatience among smaller EU states that view supply security as a matter of national defense rather than a long‑term policy goal.

Washington’s push for bilateral agreements aligns with its global strategy to build a coalition that can counterbalance China’s dominance in mineral refining and processing. A Lithuanian‑U.S. deal would not only provide immediate access to critical inputs but also signal to other Eastern European allies that alternative pathways exist outside the EU framework. Such moves could fragment the EU’s negotiating position, forcing Brussels to accelerate its own initiatives or risk losing cohesion among member states. The potential domino effect may see countries like Latvia, Estonia or Poland explore similar arrangements, reshaping the continent’s supply‑chain architecture.

Beyond economics, the stakes are fundamentally security‑related. Critical minerals underpin everything from missile guidance systems to electric‑vehicle batteries, making their supply chains a de‑facto defense issue. Lithuania’s willingness to act unilaterally highlights the urgency of establishing resilient, diversified sourcing and processing capabilities. As the EU grapples with internal delays, the emergence of nation‑specific deals could accelerate investment in third‑country mining projects, recycling technologies, and joint processing facilities, ultimately redefining the geopolitical map of critical mineral governance.

Lithuania Could Break EU Ranks Over Critical Minerals Deal

By Julianne Geiger · Feb 13, 2026, 12:50 PM CST

Lithuania is signaling it may strike its own critical minerals deal with Washington if the EU can’t finalize a bloc‑wide agreement quickly enough, a top Lithuanian official told Bloomberg this week. If it follows through, it could become the first EU member to break ranks and pursue a standalone minerals pact with the U.S., potentially setting off a domino effect among other security‑focused states in Eastern Europe.

Lithuania’s goal is to secure reliable access to the materials its engineering and defense sectors depend on. Vilnius wants to plug into U.S.-aligned supply chains that bypass China’s dominance in critical minerals processing and refining.

For a small frontline NATO state, this isn’t merely symbolism. Rare‑earth magnets, battery metals, gallium, and germanium are all inputs for electronics, weapons systems, and advanced manufacturing. China may not mine all of these, but it does control much of the refining capacity, which is where the leverage currently sits. Adding a layer of urgency is China’s recent tightening of export control on rare earths and other strategic minerals last year.

If Brussels moves slowly, as is often the case with entities made up of so many parts, Lithuania appears willing to move alone. The Commission is much more fond of structured, reciprocal agreements rather than member states cutting their own side deals. If Lithuania gets tired of the EU’s foot‑dragging moves that could conceivably span years, it could lead to sourcing arrangements, joint projects in third countries, or cooperation on processing and recycling.

The US, of course, is prone to encourage direct partnerships as it builds a wider coalition to counter China’s critical minerals dominance with regard to processing and refining.

The bigger picture is clear: in today’s market, critical minerals policy is defense policy by another name. Lithuania wants certainty. If it can’t get it through the EU fast enough, it’s prepared to get it directly from Washington.

By Julianne Geiger for Oilprice.com