Mitigating Nuclear Rivalry Between the U.S. and China Keynote

Why It Matters

Understanding the shift toward unbalanced multipolarity is essential for crafting effective nuclear risk‑reduction policies, as misreading the power landscape could trigger a catastrophic U.S.-China confrontation.

Key Takeaways

• Watson Institute convenes scholars to defuse escalating US‑China nuclear rivalry.
• Recent reports allege secret Chinese nuclear tests and US warhead expansion.
• Emma Ashford’s book argues we’re entering “unbalanced multipolarity.”
• US strategies oscillate between dominance and alliance‑building, yet lack effectiveness.
• Middle powers and spheres of influence will shape future nuclear stability.

Summary

The Watson School at Brown University hosted its second annual conference on diffusing the militarized U.S.-China rivalry, bringing together scholars, strategists, and rising experts to confront the growing risk of nuclear confrontation. Organizers highlighted recent headlines—secret Chinese nuclear test allegations, a New York Times report on China’s warhead‑fabrication capacity, and a U.S. plan to dramatically increase its own warhead stockpile—as evidence that the rivalry is deepening despite diplomatic overtures.

Key insights emerged from the opening remarks and Emma Ashford’s presentation. Ashford’s 2025 book frames the current era as the end of the unipolar moment and the rise of “unbalanced multipolarity,” where the U.S. and China lead a constellation of middle powers that lack full expeditionary capabilities. She critiques past U.S. approaches—Trump’s dominance‑centric posture and Biden’s alliance‑building—as insufficient for a world where power is more diffused and nuclear stability hinges on broader regional dynamics.

Notable references underscored the urgency: a Foreign Affairs piece titled “The U.S. and China are courting nuclear catastrophe,” and the description of Ashford as a “Jedi Knight among defense strategists.” The conference also emphasized the re‑emergence of spheres of influence and the pivotal role of middle powers, echoing scholars like Randall Schweller who argue that only a few states can wield a full super‑power portfolio.

The implications are clear: policymakers must move beyond binary bipolar frameworks and develop flexible, pragmatic strategies that incorporate middle‑power interests and regional security architectures. Failure to adapt could exacerbate nuclear risks, making the conference’s scholarly output a critical resource for shaping future U.S.-China arms‑control and diplomatic initiatives.

Original Description

Emma Ashford, Senior Fellow, Reimagining US Grand Strategy program at the Stimson Center