
Notable acceleration in the fx securities book of the Chinese state banks (And their reverse repo/ other funding of global financial institutions) in January -- consistent with the $90b monthly increase in the reported fx balance sheet https://t.co/PNDncW2w2s

Beijing really just outsourced its reserves to its state banks, and shifted out of US custodians High return on investment tho. Tons of folks swallow the fall in reported Treasury holdings hook, line and sinker https://t.co/MKw3EJlSuR

The annualized measures of Chinese intervention over the last 3ms that capture backdoor intervention by the state banks are at all time highs in dollar terms -- over $200b a quarter/ over $800b annualized https://t.co/7vlh3tf4CX
Two things are simultaneously true -- a) China's surplus doesn't automatically flow into its fx reserves and then into Treasuries and Agencies b) China's large ongoing surplus (+ the increase in fx assets of the state banks) cautions against using the...

My periodic reminder that the US TIC data doesn't measure China's holdings of US Treasuries. It only measures China's holdings of Treasuries in US custodians. The real question is how many Treasuries Chinese entities hold in non US...

One by product of China's exploding external surplus (goods surplus of $1.2 trillion, q4 current account surplus annualized is close to $1 trillion) is that it creates the raw material for some massive intervention numbers h/t @Mike_Weilandt for the chart https://t.co/PMvhatfgWh
And net reserves are still negative -- Argentina survived 2025 thanks to a $14b loan from the IMF and a willingness on the part of the IMF and the US to ignored missed reserve targets. Indeed, Argentina got another $20b backstop...

China's reported current account surplus for q4 was $242b (close to $1 trillion annualized), and the 2025 surplus was $735b -- well over 3.5% of China's GDP. This has big implications for the IMF, for Secretary Bessent and and the world...

A pet peeve. Talk about current dollar weakness. Numbers here are through December -- but in December the broad inflation adjusted dollar was stronger than in 01 or 02, the peak before 22-24 1/ https://t.co/c7KU9z1C6t

The IMF's standard way of talking about global trade and payment imbalances tends to view Europe and China similarly -- but that is now out of date. China's reported surplus will top $700b in 2025, the euro area's surplus...
It is ignored because it is misleading to compare in country sales (generated by Chinese production for sale to Chinese buyers) to exports (goods produced in one country for sale in another). Firms and countries are different economic concepts
China usually liberalizes its financial account when the PBOC (now the state banks) are accumulating assets at too rapid a pace, and it wans the dollar risk to be taken by others ... 1/2
Bingo And the global trade surplus (ex pharma) is now primarily in China, Taiwan and Korea ... Important qualification to the now standard argument the dollar has gotten weaker (which is true primarily if the clock starts at the end of 24,...

Crazy how much of the global (goods) trade surplus is in East Asia now. Even with the "fake" Irish pharma surplus, the euro area is dwarfed 1/ https://t.co/eZjcgAlVqC