Hardware-Software Interface (WiCS Seminars 2026 Week 6)

Why It Matters

Memory‑safety flaws cost billions in breaches; hardware‑assisted defenses are essential for protecting critical software ecosystems.

Key Takeaways

• Memory‑safety flaws cause ~70% of critical security bugs in major software.
• C and C++ lack automatic memory management, increasing vulnerability risk.
• Hardware‑assisted techniques like ROP mitigation can enforce memory safety.
• CVE databases catalog vulnerabilities, guiding patches and hardware‑software defenses.
• Upcoming seminars will cover hardware‑software interface and admissions info.

Summary

The final WiCS seminar focused on the hardware‑software interface, zeroing in on memory‑safety vulnerabilities that dominate modern cyber‑risk. Presenter Tenhu, a first‑year Cambridge PhD, explained how low‑level bugs in C/C++—from buffer overflows to use‑after‑free—fuel attacks such as WannaCry ransomware and return‑oriented programming exploits. Key insights highlighted that roughly 70% of critical security bugs stem from memory‑safety flaws, that CVE databases systematically track these issues, and that hardware‑assisted mechanisms (e.g., ROP mitigation, pointer‑bounds checking) can dramatically improve protection. The talk contrasted unsafe languages with managed runtimes like Java or Python, noting that even those rely on unsafe C/C++ cores. Examples included audience‑generated attack vectors, a live ROP demo on a vulnerable C program, and a clarification that C# is generally memory‑safe due to its runtime. The presenter emphasized pointers as the bridge between software and hardware, explaining spatial and temporal errors that lead to corruption. Implications are clear: enterprises must adopt hardware‑assisted memory‑safety solutions and prioritize patching CVE‑listed bugs, while students are encouraged to explore research at the intersection of hardware design and secure software development.

Original Description

Hardware-software interface: How it contributes to better computer security

Modern computer security relies heavily on software-based defences, including analysis tools that look for bugs and patches that fix reported vulnerabilities. Although safer programming languages and improved system designs have significantly reduced many risks, memory safety problems still remain as a major security concern, accounting for over 70% of serious vulnerabilities in Microsoft and Chromium codebases. In this talk, we explore how rethinking the boundary between hardware and software opens up exciting new opportunities for stronger security guarantees. We show how this interface represents a design space full of trade-offs, and how the design approach requires piecing together multiple layers of the computer to build a secure and practical system.

This event was part of the Women in Computer Seminar series and took place as a live Zoom webinar on Tuesday 24 February 2026.