Communicative Deterrence in the Information Environment | Irregular Warfare Center

Key Takeaways

• Adversaries exploit information environment to erode democratic will
• Resilience acts as deterrence by denial against information attacks
• Communicative deterrence uses five communication processes to build resilience
• Continuous narrative shaping reduces adversaries' ROI on disinformation
• Western policies must prioritize public engagement over pure military force

Summary

Dr. Rupinder Mangat of Defence Research and Development Canada proposes “communicative deterrence,” a framework that leverages strategic communication to build societal resilience against adversarial information operations. The model treats resilience as deterrence by denial, arguing that a public that can absorb and recover from disinformation reduces an attacker’s return on investment. Mangat links this approach to the broader thesis of *Winning Without Fighting*, which stresses influence and narrative shaping over kinetic force. He calls on Western governments to engage continuously with citizens, shaping narratives that reinforce trust and recovery capability.

Pulse Analysis

The modern information environment is a battlefield where connectivity and content creation are ubiquitous, allowing hostile actors to flood societies with disinformation, propaganda, and “information pollution.” Traditional deterrence, rooted in punitive military threats, struggles to address the subtle, civilian‑focused tactics that erode public trust and political will. As democratic societies become increasingly interwoven with digital platforms, the cost of ignoring this domain rises sharply, prompting scholars and policymakers to seek non‑kinetic solutions that protect the very fabric of public discourse.

Communicative deterrence reframes resilience as a proactive, communication‑driven shield. Drawing on the Communication Theory of Resilience (CTR), Mangat identifies five overlapping processes—crafting normalcy, foregrounding productive action, affirming identity anchors, maintaining communication networks, and deploying alternative logics—that collectively enable populations to absorb, adapt to, and recover from information attacks. When these processes are institutionalized, the adversary’s calculus changes: the expected impact of disinformation drops, diminishing the operation’s return on investment and effectively deterring further aggression through denial rather than punishment.

For policymakers, the implication is clear: investment must shift from solely military capabilities to sustained public‑engagement strategies that shape narratives, reinforce shared values, and maintain robust communication channels. This aligns with the strategic insights of *Winning Without Fighting*, which argues that influence and resilience are decisive in gray‑zone competition. Nations that embed communicative deterrence into their security architecture will not only safeguard democratic institutions but also set a precedent for conflict resolution that prioritizes dialogue over force, positioning themselves ahead of adversaries who rely on information manipulation.