Defending Global Order Against China’s Maritime Insurgency – Part 1

Key Takeaways

• China uses low‑intensity coercion against civilian fishermen.
• U.S. Maritime COIN project employs persistent littoral presence.
• New Chinese maritime law (effective May 2026) formalizes disputes.
• Regional partners like Philippines boost coast guard capabilities.
• Freedom of the seas underpins global trade and rule‑of‑law.

Summary

The interview with former Navy maritime strategist Hunter Stires outlines how China’s “maritime insurgency” targets civilian vessels in the South China Sea, seeking to replace the centuries‑old freedom‑of‑the‑sea principle with its own “blue national soil” doctrine. Stires explains the U.S. Maritime Counterinsurgency (COIN) project, which uses persistent littoral combat ship deployments to protect local fishermen and reinforce international law without full‑scale war. He notes China’s new maritime law, set to take effect in May 2026, will create parallel dispute‑resolution mechanisms to legitimize its claims. The effort has spurred stronger coast‑guard actions by the Philippines and other regional allies, demonstrating a shift from legacy naval posturing to low‑intensity, civilian‑focused deterrence.

Pulse Analysis

The South China Sea has become a testing ground for a new kind of geopolitical contest that sidesteps traditional naval battles. By targeting fishermen, oil‑rig crews and other civilian mariners, China is attempting to rewrite the centuries‑old freedom‑of‑the‑sea doctrine that underlies the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This low‑intensity pressure campaign, described by experts as a maritime insurgency, seeks to normalize Chinese authority over disputed waters while avoiding direct military confrontation.

In response, the United States launched the Maritime Counterinsurgency (COIN) project, shifting focus from large‑scale warships to a persistent, beat‑cop style presence using littoral combat ships and forward‑deployed assets. This approach emphasizes protecting local civilian vessels, building trust with regional partners, and signaling a continuous commitment to the rules‑based order. The strategy has already encouraged the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia to adopt more assertive coast‑guard operations, effectively turning the gray‑zone into a visible arena of lawful resistance.

China’s recent enactment of a domestic maritime law, slated for May 2026, institutionalizes its parallel dispute‑resolution system and further entrenches its “blue national soil” narrative. If left unchecked, such legal frameworks could legitimize the partitioning of international waters, undermining global supply chains that rely on open sea lanes. Continued U.S. investment in low‑end naval assets, combined with diplomatic support for regional navies, will be crucial to preserving the open‑sea principle and preventing a balkanized oceanic order.