Lessons From Ukraine on Cognitive Warfare: Journal of Strategic Security

Key Takeaways

• Russia blends cyber, disinformation, PMCs, religion to confuse
• Ukraine counters with coordinated messaging, volunteer cyber “IT Army”
• China favors gradual narrative shaping over overt disinformation
• Cognitive warfare now central battlespace for state competition
• Western institutions need agile frameworks to match adversaries

Summary

A 2025 Journal of Strategic Security report by Briggs and Tusor examines Ukraine’s war as a case study in cognitive warfare, highlighting how Russia employs cyber attacks, disinformation, private militias, and religious channels to manipulate perception. The authors detail Ukraine’s resilient response, including government messaging, volunteer cyber networks like the “IT Army,” and civil‑society coordination that blunt Russian narratives. They contrast Russia’s “firehose” tactics with China’s slower, persuasive narrative dominance. The report warns that shaping minds, not just territories, is now the primary battleground for great powers.

Pulse Analysis

The rise of cognitive warfare marks a shift from kinetic battles to battles for perception. Russia’s playbook, rooted in Soviet‑era maskirovka and modern reflexive control, blends cyber intrusions, state‑run disinformation, private military contractors, and even the Russian Orthodox Church to sow confusion and fragment societies. By targeting the information environment, Moscow seeks to pressure opponents into decisions that favor its strategic goals, turning narratives into weapons.

Ukraine’s experience demonstrates that a coordinated information strategy can blunt such attacks. Government ministries have centralized messaging, while volunteer cyber collectives—most notably the “IT Army”—launch defensive and offensive operations against Russian propaganda channels. Civil‑society groups amplify authentic narratives, reinforcing domestic cohesion and projecting credibility abroad. These efforts illustrate that resilience in the cognitive domain hinges on rapid, unified responses that blend official communication with grassroots digital activism.

For Western allies, the lesson is clear: institutional inertia threatens the ability to compete in the perception arena. China’s approach, favoring gradual narrative dominance rather than overt “firehose” tactics, underscores the need for long‑term, persuasive campaigns that normalize desired outcomes before conflict erupts. To stay ahead, the U.S. and its partners must align authority, legitimacy, and action across agencies, creating agile frameworks that can operate at ecosystem speed. Investing in cross‑sector partnerships, real‑time analytics, and decentralized response teams will be essential to safeguard democratic societies against the next wave of cognitive aggression.