Proxy Warfare: The Missing Facet of Australian Defence Policy

Key Takeaways

• Historical Australian doctrine included proxy and subversion tactics.
• Post‑1975 literature shows near‑total policy vacuum on proxies.
• China’s gray‑zone activities threaten regional stability.
• Reviving proxy concepts strengthens deterrence and regional resistance.
• Aligning with allies requires clear proxy warfare framework.

Summary

Andrew Maher’s March 2026 article warns that Australian defence policy has largely abandoned proxy warfare, a tool once central to the nation’s World‑II and early Cold‑War strategies. The piece documents a literature gap after 1975, despite the resurgence of gray‑zone tactics and state‑backed insurgencies in the Indo‑Pacific. Maher argues that without a clear doctrine, Australia cannot effectively deter or counter covert external support for non‑state actors. He calls for a revival of conceptual clarity to bolster deterrence, alliance coordination, and regional resistance.

Pulse Analysis

Australia’s early security architecture embraced proxy tactics, from Special Operations Australia’s guerrilla support in WWII to Cold‑War counter‑insurgency plans against communist insurgents. Those doctrines recognized that influencing non‑state actors could achieve strategic objectives without crossing the threshold of open war. Over time, however, official publications and doctrinal guidance fell silent, creating a generational blind spot that now hampers policymakers tasked with navigating a complex gray‑zone environment.

Today, Beijing’s use of covert funding, training, and political influence across Southeast Asian fringe states exemplifies the very threats Maher highlights. From alleged support to separatist movements in Bougainville to covert backing of the New People’s Army in the Philippines, China’s proxy playbooks exploit the lack of an Australian response framework. This asymmetry erodes regional stability, complicates intelligence sharing, and forces Canberra to react rather than shape outcomes, raising the risk of miscalculation in a high‑stakes strategic competition.

Reintegrating proxy warfare into Australia’s defence doctrine would provide a structured approach to countering covert aggression. A clear policy could enable targeted resistance assistance, enhance joint planning with the United States and regional partners, and signal resolve to adversaries. By codifying gray‑zone response options, Australia would improve deterrence, protect its northern approaches, and contribute to a coordinated democratic front against autocratic influence, aligning national security strategy with contemporary geopolitical realities.