The War Will End Very Badly for the USA & Israel, Whatever Fantasies the White House Tries to Spin: Col. Doug MacGregor Explains Why, His Reading Based on What We Call "Reality"

Key Takeaways

• US backed 1953 Iranian coup, sowed long-term instability.
• CIA trained SAVAK, linking West to Iran's repression.
• American support for jihadist groups created future adversaries.
• Current conflict risks strategic defeat for US and Israel.
• Historical miscalculations undermine credibility of US foreign policy.

Summary

Colonel Doug MacGregor argues that decades‑long U.S. and Israeli interventions—from the 1953 CIA‑backed coup in Iran to the training of SAVAK and later support for jihadist groups—have created a strategic backlash that will culminate in a disastrous outcome for both the United States and Israel in the current conflict. He cites the Shah’s memoir to illustrate how Western powers facilitated the rise of the Islamic Republic, and points to similar patterns of backing al Qaeda, Hamas and the Taliban as short‑term Cold‑War tactics. The post warns that the war’s end will be “very badly” for the U.S. and Israel, regardless of White House spin.

Pulse Analysis

The United States’ pattern of covert intervention in the Middle East began in earnest with the 1953 Iranian coup, a joint CIA‑MI6 operation that ousted a democratically elected leader and installed the Shah. This maneuver, driven by oil interests and Cold‑War anxieties, also laid the groundwork for the creation of SAVAK, Iran’s notorious secret police, which received extensive CIA training. The legacy of that partnership persisted, embedding a deep mistrust of Western motives within the region and establishing a template for future proxy engagements.

Decades later, Washington repeated the strategy by courting extremist factions as bulwarks against perceived Soviet or regional threats. Financial and logistical aid to al Qaeda, Hamas, and even the Taliban was rationalized as a means to bleed adversaries, yet these groups evolved into formidable opponents of U.S. interests. The unintended consequences of such alliances are now evident as the same networks challenge American and Israeli security, fueling cycles of violence that the original architects never anticipated.

The current war underscores the strategic cost of these historic miscalculations. As the conflict drags on, the United States and Israel face heightened diplomatic isolation, potential military overextension, and a credibility crisis that hampers future coalition building. Policymakers must confront the long‑term fallout of past proxy wars, reassess reliance on short‑term tactical allies, and develop a more sustainable, values‑driven approach to Middle Eastern engagement.